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ABSTRACT
Territoriality is a foundational principle of international order, and
U.S. laws have always operated on a territorial basis. However, when U.S.
jurisprudence speaks of extraterritorial application of its laws, it is usually
assessing whether the legislature or the court has jurisdiction over persons,
properties and conducts outside of the territorial borders of the United
States. This paper argues that such a conception of the extraterritoriality
doctrine only reveals half of the picture, because U.S. courts may indirectly
apply U.S. law beyond U.S. borders through extraterritorial court orders
without relying on extraterritorial jurisdiction. I term such exercise of
extraterritorial power “Equity Extraterritoriality,” because the court’s
power to make such extraterritorial orders stems from the equity tradition.
Under Equity Extraterritoriality, U.S. courts first obtain jurisdiction
over a person, then indirectly exercise extraterritorial authority by ordering
the person to take certain actions outside of the courts’ territorial
jurisdiction, or dispose of properties located outside of the courts’ territorial
jurisdiction. Importantly, to Equity Extraterritoriality—which covers
everything that happens in litigation other than jurisdiction, including
provisional orders, discovery orders and post-judgment orders—there is
hardly any application of territoriality principles, causing problems
typically associated with extraterritoriality, such as causing a diplomatic
strain. This contradicts U.S. law’s general respect for territoriality, as well
as the application of territoriality principles to limit judicial and legislative
jurisdiction. This paper provides a brief overview of Equity
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Extraterritoriality’s historical development, explores the problems posed by
Equity Extraterritoriality’s extraterritorial reach and under-development,
and proposes a conflict-of-laws-based solution to apply territoriality
principles so as to curb the worst excesses of Equity Extraterritoriality.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

CPLR [New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules] article 52 contains no
express territorial limitation barring the entry of a turnover order that
requires a garnishee to transfer money or property into New York from
another state or country. It would have been an easy matter for the
Legislature to have added such a restriction to the reach of article 52 and
there is no basis for us to infer it from the broad language presently in the
statute.1

*
*
*
Territoriality is a foundational principle of the international order.
Since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, the world has been organized as
multitudes of sovereign nations, each exercising exclusive governing
authority over a defined territory.2 This understanding forms the basis of our
current international law. The United States, having come to existence in
1776, has always operated its legal system on a territorial basis.3 A major
expression of the territoriality principles in U.S. law is the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, which has existed in U.S.
jurisprudence for nearly as long as the Republic itself.4 While it is true that
the relative strength of that presumption has waxed and waned throughout
history,5 today, the doctrine of presumption against extraterritoriality is
undergoing glory days. In a series of decisions during the last few decades,
the Supreme Court repeatedly pronounced that as a general matter, U.S. laws

1. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 12 N.Y.3d 533, 539 (2009).
2. See Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty, 21 INT’L
HIST. REV. 569, 569–70 (1999); KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 8 (1st ed. 2009).
3. See James Weinstein, Early American Origins of Territoriality and in Judicial Jurisdiction, 37
ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1, 2–3 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
5. See discussion infra Sections III.B.2., III.C.1.
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apply only within the territorial borders of the United States. The holding in
Morrison v. National Australian Bank, a 2010 case in which the Supreme
Court decided that the implied cause of action created by Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not apply beyond U.S. borders,
encapsulates the strength of territoriality principles in the U.S. law today:
“unless a contrary intent appears” in the statute, the law “is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”6
Given the strength of the presumption against extraterritoriality today,
the above-quoted language from the recent case of Koehler v. Bank of
Bermuda is surprising in its flagrant disregard of that presumption. In
Koehler, the highest court of the State of New York found that Article 52 of
the New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules (“CPLR”) authorized a New
York court to order the defendant to deliver certain stock certificates located
in Bermuda. In so holding, the court first (correctly) noted that the text of
CPLR Article 52 has no extraterritoriality limitation. And instead of
eschewing extraterritorial application of Article 52, as the U.S. Supreme
Court instructed in Morrison, the New York Court of Appeals took the
opposite path and refused to “infer [a territorial limitation] from the broad
language presently in the statute,” reasoning that “[i]t would have been an
easy matter for the Legislature to have added such a restriction to the reach
of Article 52.”7
The highest court of the United States says the law is to be applied
within the territorial jurisdiction unless the law specifically states otherwise;
the highest court of the State of New York says the law may be applied
beyond the territorial jurisdiction, unless the law specifically states
otherwise. How can these two seemingly contradictory propositions, issued
just one year apart from each other, stand together? I suggest that the origin
of this contradiction goes deeper than the superficial distinction between
federal court and state court, or that between a substantive statute and a
procedural statute. The contradiction originates from the fact that the New
York Court of Appeals was applying a different tradition of the
extraterritoriality doctrine in U.S. law, which developed on a track quite
separate from that of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
This separate doctrine may be described as “Equity Extraterritoriality.”
A succinct definition of Equity Extraterritoriality may be “the court’s
authority, originating from the court’s equitable powers, to order a person to
take certain actions outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction.” Equity

6. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010).
7. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825, 829 (N.Y. 2009).
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Extraterritoriality is an indirect form of extraterritoriality. Rather than
asserting jurisdiction directly over actions occurring beyond its territorial
jurisdiction, the court (typically, but not always) first establishes its own
jurisdiction over a person, then orders the person to take actions outside of
the court’s territorial jurisdiction. In this sense, Equity Extraterritoriality
stands in opposition to “jurisdictional extraterritoriality,” i.e. the court’s
authority to directly reach beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, Equity Extraterritoriality is an application of U.S. laws
beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. The fact that Equity
Extraterritoriality reaches beyond U.S. borders indirectly through a person
under the court’s jurisdiction does not change the end result that a U.S. court
is demanding compliance with its orders beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
However, throughout its long history and to this day, U.S. territoriality
doctrine has considered extraterritorial court orders as “territorial.” This is
so because the court usually establishes in personam jurisdiction over the
person through which it is effectuating the extraterritorial order (although in
practice, that is not always the case).8 Once the court obtains jurisdiction,
the current U.S. territoriality doctrine considers everything occurring
thereafter to be “territorial,” notwithstanding the fact that extraterritorial
court orders are no less an application of U.S. law beyond U.S. borders. In
other words, the U.S. territoriality doctrine has focused almost exclusively
on the question of “jurisdictionality,” i.e. whether the court may assert
judicial jurisdiction beyond its territorial jurisdiction.9
Once the
jurisdictional hurdle is cleared, there is no meaningful application of
territoriality principles to everything else that happens afterwards in
litigation.
This means under Equity Extraterritoriality, the court may order the
person under its jurisdiction to take a wide variety of extraterritorial actions,
including: disposition of tangible and intangible property located outside of
the court’s territorial jurisdiction;10 preservation and delivery of evidence
located outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction;11 discontinuation of a
legal action filed in another country;12 prohibition of business transactions in
8. See discussion infra Sections II.A., IV.C.3.
9. See John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 352
(2010) (noting that much of “presumption against extraterritoriality” may be more properly described as
“presumption against extrajurisdictionality”).
10. See, e.g., Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 829.
11. See, e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 522
(1987); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255 (2004).
12. See, e.g,, Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
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another country,13 or nearly any other activity occurring entirely outside of
the court’s territorial jurisdiction.14 Yet there is essentially no legal test that
limits this broad operation of Equity Extraterritoriality. The Supreme Court,
which has been very active in the recent years in defining the contours of
territoriality as applied to jurisdiction, has made virtually no attempt to
address Equity Extraterritoriality. In some cases, the severe underdevelopment of Equity Extraterritoriality surprised even the Supreme Court
itself. During the oral argument for Baker v. General Motors, a 1998 case
involving Equity Extraterritoriality, Justice Stephen Breyer exclaimed with
incredulity: “In 200 years of history, it must have come up before . . . I’m
amazed that there isn’t something written [making this issue] absolutely
clear.”15 The result of this under-development is the inconsistency in the U.S.
territoriality doctrine that can be observed from the contradiction between
Koehler and Morrison. Even as the Supreme Court admonished that U.S.
laws must not be construed to apply beyond U.S. borders unless the law
clearly authorized extraterritorial application, the New York Court of
Appeals applied a New York law over the property located in Bermuda
because the law did not clearly prohibit extraterritorial application. This
inconsistency allows parties to achieve extraterritorial application of U.S.
law that they generally cannot under the principles of territoriality.
The practical consequences of this inattention to Equity
Extraterritoriality are significant. By reaching beyond their territorial
jurisdiction via Equity Extraterritoriality, U.S. courts often contravene the
interests of foreign sovereigns and cause diplomatic rows.16 The lack of
meaningful check on Equity Extraterritoriality also allows U.S. courts to
routinely put parties under conflicting legal obligations, holding them in
terrorem to choose between disobeying a U.S. court order and breaking a
foreign law.17 When the Second Circuit overextended the reach of Equity
Extraterritoriality, its decision nearly destroyed banking in New York.18
These consequences will become more severe in the coming years as the role

13. See, e.g., NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), LEXIS 168292
at *9–*11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012), aff’d 727 F.3d 230, 248 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2819,
2819 (2014).
14. See Thomas Carl Spelling, Treatise on Injunctions and Other Extraordinary Remedies Covering
Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo Warranto, and Certiorari or Review 5 (2d ed. 1901) (“The
range of purpose for which this remedial writ [an injunction] may be invoked is almost infinite.”).
15. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 222 (1998) (No.
96-653).
16. See discussion infra Sections IV.B.1., IV.B.2.
17. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3.
18. See discussion infra Section IV.C.1.
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of Equity Extraterritoriality will only become more prominent in the future.
A U.S. party engaged in global commerce has every incentive to try to
control the activities occurring beyond U.S. borders by way of U.S. court
adjudication. In addition, the ever-increasing importance of intangible
properties—assets with no physical presence, except through the persons
who control them—makes the indirect control of extraterritorial property
through a person even more critical.19
Despite this urgency, scholarly attention to Equity Extraterritoriality
has been scant. During the oral argument in Baker, Justice Anthony Kennedy
inquired: “What I’m looking for is the case or the law review article in 200
years that went into what I would think was the most simple basic
question[.]”20 If Justice Kennedy resumed the search for a law review article
discussing the topic today, two full decades since Baker, he would be mostly
disappointed. Although extraterritorial application of the U.S. law is a topic
that inspires a great deal of legal scholarship, such scholarship almost
exclusively focuses on jurisdictional extraterritoriality.21 To the extent they
exist, studies of Equity Extraterritoriality are fragmented, as they do not treat
it as a standalone inquiry. They either analyze the situation where Equity
Extraterritoriality
is
incidentally
connected
to
jurisdictional
extraterritoriality (for example, when the court issues an extraterritorial
injunction to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act abroad),22 or where a
particular type of Equity Extraterritoriality happens to emerge as an issue in
a discrete area of law (such as collection of evidence from abroad or
protecting intellectual property across state borders).23 The most

19. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
20. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 222 (1998) (No.
96-653). See also Linda Greenhouse, Court Weighs Whether One State Must Obey Another’s Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997 at A25. As discussed further in this paper, the Baker opinion was a long way
away from addressing the full array of problems associated with Equity Extraterritoriality because Baker
only represented one genus of Equity Extraterritoriality. See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
21. A typical example is: RAUSTIALA, supra note 2, an excellent discussion of the history and
current practice of extraterritorial application of the U.S. law that nonetheless focuses its attention almost
entirely on the question of jurisdiction. Similarly, Justice Breyer’s recent and highly acclaimed discussion
of the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. law contains no meaningful analysis of extraterritorial court
orders. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL
REALITIES 112 (1st ed. 2015). This could also be due to the general lack of scholarly interest in the
history of equity in the United States. See John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789–1835, and the
History of American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1428 (1998) (noting the “extremely limited”
knowledge about the history of U.S. Supreme Court equity).
22. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627,
641–42 (2001); Breyer, supra note 21 at 95–107.
23. See, e.g., Geoffrey Sant, Court-Ordered Law Breaking: U.S. Courts Increasingly Order the
Violation of Foreign Law, 81 BROOKLYN L. REV. 181, 181–82 (2015) (collection of evidence); David S.

PARK PUBLICATION VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

106

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/5/2017 1:42 PM

[Vol 28:99

comprehensive scholarly analysis of Equity Extraterritoriality, by Professor
Polly Price, is nearly 20 years old (written partially in response to the
Supreme Court’s inquiry in Baker).24 While Price’s article is highly
insightful, it only considered half of the problem of Equity
Extraterritoriality—namely, the domestic Equity Extraterritoriality situation
in the context of U.S. federalism. There is virtually no scholarly discussion
as to international Equity Extraterritoriality, in which no legal superstructure
harmonizes the exercise of sovereignty by various nations.
This article attempts to fill this gap. Focusing only on jurisdictional
extraterritoriality does not address the problems of Equity Extraterritoriality.
To limit the excess of Equity Extraterritoriality, there must be a legal test
that more forcefully applies the territoriality principles whenever the court is
contemplating an order that may have extraterritorial implications. To that
end, I propose a test that may be characterized as a “comity-fueled conflict
of laws” test that mediates the competing sovereign interests that an
extraterritorial court order may implicate.25
*
*
*
The remainder of this paper will proceed in four parts. Part II describes
the operation of Equity Extraterritoriality in greater detail by presenting a
case study on how Equity Extraterritoriality applies U.S. law beyond the U.S.
borders. Here, I note that the operation of Equity Extraterritoriality depends
on two links of control: the court’s control over a person, and the person’s
control over actions or things outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
These links are, in engineering lingo, potential points of failure. When the
strength of the control that makes up each link is compromised—either
legally or practically—the links fail and create a problem.
Part III will offer a brief history of Equity Extraterritoriality, in which I
argue that the origin of Equity Extraterritoriality may be traced to the
landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff,26 which applied territoriality principles
to judicial jurisdiction but not to court orders issued after the jurisdiction was
obtained. This section observes the growth of Equity Extraterritoriality in the
early 20th century, when it saw a brief period of harmonization with
jurisdictional extraterritoriality. Then this section describes the split in
attitudes toward territoriality principles in the late 20th century, leading to
Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State Antidilution Laws, 67 TUL. L. REV.
1, 2–4 (1992) (protection of intellectual property).
24. See Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747, 751–92
(1998).
25. See discussion infra Section V.A.2.
26. 94 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).

PARK PUBLICATION VERSION(DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/5/2017 1:42 PM

EQUITY EXTRATERRITORIALITY

107

today’s contradictory positions of jurisdictional extraterritoriality and Equity
Extraterritoriality.
In Part IV, this paper will examine the Equity Extraterritoriality
doctrine as it exists today, and identify its doctrinal problems. I first present
the scale of the problems posed by Equity Extraterritoriality by focusing on
a particular feature of modern economy: intangible properties. Because
intangible properties have no physical situs, controlling intangible properties
increasingly requires controlling the person who controls the intangible
properties. Such a mode of indirect control coincides with the operation of
Equity Extraterritoriality. Accordingly, the importance of Equity
Extraterritoriality is bound to rise as intangible property becomes more
important. Set against this background, I identify the two broad categories
of problems presented by Equity Extraterritoriality: the problems arising
from extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, and the problems arising from
the doctrine’s severe under-development and lack of limiting principles.
Finally in Part V, this paper will propose a solution, facilitating
application of territorial principles to Equity Extraterritoriality. Here, I give
greater attention to international Equity Extraterritoriality, as it is less
developed and poses more significant problems relative to domestic Equity
Extraterritoriality. I find that a solution must address the ultimate source of
the problem of Equity Extraterritoriality, i.e. regulating the clashing claims
of various sovereigns. For Equity Extraterritoriality in the domestic context,
the U.S. Constitution provides sufficient legal principles and infrastructure
to mediate such conflicts. International Equity Extraterritoriality, however,
lacks an analogous superstructure. Here, I submit that the solution is to be
discovered in the two legal theories whose purpose is to balance the different
interests of sovereigns: the concept of international comity, and the
mechanism of conflict of laws. To this end, I propose a legal test that may
be characterized as a “comity-fueled conflict of laws,” a more robust form
of comity test that gives due respect for foreign sovereigns.
II. UNDERSTANDING EQUITY EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Equity Extraterritoriality is a concept that eludes a concise descriptive
definition, precisely because the types of extraterritorial orders that the court
can make are so varied.27 Many of these orders may be categorized as
remedies (for example, extraterritorial injunctions) but many others are not
remedies in the strict sense (for example, extraterritorial discovery orders).

27. See Spelling, supra note 14, at 5 (“The range of purpose for which this remedial writ [an
injunction] may be invoked is almost infinite.”).
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As discussed further below, the merger of law and equity created further
confusion because court orders that were traditionally considered “legal”
orders took on “equitable” characteristics post-merger.28 That is to say,
although the term Equity Extraterritoriality points to the historical source of
the court’s power—namely, the power of courts sitting in equity29—not all
extraterritorial court orders can be characterized as equitable orders.30
The best way to understand this amorphous concept, then, is to observe
the actual operation of Equity Extraterritoriality and see how it applies U.S.
laws beyond U.S. borders. To that end, this section offers an extended
example of Equity Extraterritoriality and discusses several other common
variations of Equity Extraterritoriality.
A. How Equity Extraterritoriality Governs Beyond Borders: a Case Study
A brief exposition of one example of Equity Extraterritoriality may be
helpful to demonstrate precisely how Equity Extraterritoriality is indeed an
application of U.S. law beyond the U.S. courts’ territorial jurisdiction. U.S.
courts’ collection of evidence located abroad is a good example of Equity
Extraterritoriality. The courts’ power to guide discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure originates from the courts’ equitable powers.31
With this power, the court orders a person under its jurisdiction to take
certain actions outside of its territorial jurisdiction—namely, preserve,
collect, and produce physical evidence located outside the borders of the
United States—and thereby regulates the pattern of foreign corporations’
record keeping.
One must understand that discovery practice of U.S. courts is not
merely rules of court administration, but a means of corporate governance in
regards to corporate record-keeping. This is because, to a significant extent,
discovery practice of U.S. courts dictates the routine business behavior of
corporations. Under U.S. law, parties are required to preserve documents
long before the actual commencement of the litigation, as soon as “a party

28. See discussion infra Section III.B.2.a.
29. See discussion infra Section III.A.
30. For example, writ of mandamus is traditionally considered a legal remedy. However, using
this legal remedy, the court can order a government official to take actions beyond its territorial borders.
In this sense, that mandamus is considered a legal remedy does not make it exempt from Equity
Extraterritoriality.
31. See John H. Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery: a Rebuttal, 83 YALE
L.J. 1620, 1630 (1974); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914–26 (1987); Rhonda Wasserman,
The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer’s Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REV. 37, 43–45 (1989) (tracing the origin
of U.S. court’s subpoena power to English Chancery procedures).
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reasonably anticipates litigation.”32 To satisfy this requirement, American
businesses are advised to create a document retention policy regardless of
whether they actually anticipate litigation in the near term.33 When litigation
appears on the horizon, particularly in large commercial cases, it is common
for a corporation to retain the (very expensive) services of an e-discovery
vendor in order to properly preserve the documents and produce them as
necessary.34 Failure to do so, in severe cases, may result in the literal death
of the corporation, as was the case with the accounting firm Arthur Andersen
LLP in the aftermath of the Enron scandal.35
This means that when a U.S. court orders a foreign corporation to
produce documents and other physical evidence located outside of the
territorial boundaries of the United States, the U.S. court is essentially
mandating American-style corporate record keeping laws to foreign
corporations. And U.S. courts quite frequently order foreign corporations to
produce documents located outside of the courts’ territorial jurisdiction.36
Several foreign corporations, sued in U.S. courts by U.S. plaintiffs, have
been accused of failing to institute a U.S.-style litigation hold—a measure
that is unheard of in their home jurisdiction.37 One foreign corporation lost
its litigation and became subject to a judgment in the amount of more than
$920 million, in large part because the corporation was sanctioned for
spoliation of evidence after failing to preserve documents in the manner
required by U.S. law.38 As a result, U.S.-style e-discovery vendors are
hanging shingles throughout the world to assist foreign firms with Americanstyle document forensics.39 One could hardly find a surer sign of U.S. law’s
32. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82492, at *14 (D. Neb. 2007) (“When the
prospect of litigation is present, parties are required to preserve documents that may be relevant to the
issues to be raised, and their failure to do so may result in a finding of spoliation of evidence.”).
33. See Nat’l Fed. Of Ind. Business, NFIB GUIDE TO DEVELOPING A DRP 3 (2016)
http://www.nfib.com/Portals/0/PDF/AllUsers/legal/guides/document-retention-policy-guide-nfib.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3F7B-A7EC] (“A DRP [document retention policy] that is consistently followed may
aid significantly in any litigation that might arise.”).
34. See, e.g., FTI CONSULTING, http://www.ftitechnology.com/.
35. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005); see also Brandon L.
Garrett, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 19–44 (2014).
36. See Sant, supra note 23, at 181–84 (discussing the rise of extraterritorial discovery order that
requires the party to break foreign laws).
37. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 803 F.Supp.2d 469, 505 (E.D. Va.
2011) (issuing order for adverse jury instruction and attorneys fee award for failing to preserve evidence);
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., No. 11 civ 1846 (LHK) (PSG), slip op. at 1 (N.D. Cal. July 24,
2012) (requesting adverse jury instruction for spoliation of evidence).
38. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 894 F.Supp.2d 691, 691 (E.D. Va. 2012).
39. See, e.g., Deloitte Transactions and Business Analytics LLP, DELOITTE DISCOVERY: THE
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extraterritorial application than consultants who assist foreign companies to
comply with American law while doing business outside of the United
States.
Seeing the conflicts created by an order to produce extraterritorial
evidence is another way to realize that such an order truly is an
extraterritorial exercise of the court’s power. The primary reason why there
is a presumption against extraterritoriality is to avoid contravening an
interest of a foreign sovereign.40 Yet an order to produce extraterritorial
evidence routinely does exactly this.41 As the reporter of the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations put it: “No aspect of the extension of the
American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has
given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation
and litigation in the United States.”42 Many foreign nations have passed
blocking statutes specifically in response to U.S.-style document
discovery.43 But U.S. courts usually ignore this clearly-expressed preference
of foreign sovereigns and order the persons under the courts’ jurisdiction to
submit extraterritorial evidence.44 Sometimes, U.S. court’s challenge to
foreign sovereign’s interest in the context of discovery can be even more
direct: as the Supreme Court recently pronounced in Republic of Argentina
v. NML Capital, Ltd., a U.S. court may order extraterritorial discovery of
foreign sovereign’s assets as part of post-judgment discovery, regardless of
the nature of the sovereign assets to be discovered.45 This deliberate rejection
of foreign sovereign interests often puts a person under conflicting legal
obligations—which, again, the U.S. courts usually ignore.46
RIGHT TEAM FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, at 17 (showing e-Discovery office locations in Amsterdam,
Auckland, Bangkok, Beijing, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Calgary, Copenhagen, Dubai, Dublin,
Dusseldorf, Edmonton, Frankfurt, George Town, Hong Kong, Hyderabad, London, Madrid, Melbourne,
Mexico City, Milan, Moscow, Munich, Oslo, Paris, Prague, Pretoria, Sao Paolo, Santiago, Seoul,
Shanghai, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Vancouver, Vienna and Zurich), available at
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/finance/us-advisory-discovery.pdf.
40. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355–58 (1909).
41. See Sant, supra note 23, at 212–25.
42. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 442, n.1.
43. See id.
44. See Sant, supra note 23, at 185.
45. 134 S.Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014). See also Aaron D. Simowitz, Transnational Enforcement
Discovery, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3293 (2015) (discussing NML Capital in the context of post-judgment
discovery).
46. See Sant, supra note 23, at 212–21; see also First Nat’l City Bank of New York v. Internal
Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616, 618–19 (2d Cir. 1959) (rejecting the conflicting obligation created by
Panama’s bank secrecy laws). For examples of other types of Equity Extraterritoriality that puts a foreign
corporation under inconsistent legal obligations, see Fargo v. Redfield, 22 F. 373, 375 (1st Cir. 1884);
United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 828 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the claim by a
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No matter—one may object: isn’t submitting to the U.S. court’s
jurisdiction (and dealing with occasional inconsistent judgments) the price
that a corporation must pay for doing business in the United States?47 As
long as Equity Extraterritoriality orders persons under the court’s
jurisdiction, what is the problem? Yet a U.S. court need not have jurisdiction
over the foreign party to extend its power beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
This is so because extraterritorial application of the law is not merely a
collection of instances in which a nation directly enforces its laws outside of
the national borders. A speed limit over a stretch of highway governs the
entire stretch, even if the police catch only a fraction of the drivers who
violate the speed limit. Similarly, even with statutes that explicitly authorize
extraterritorial enforcement, actual enforcement is at best intermittent. As
Professor Jack Goldsmith noted, extraterritorial application of the law may
mean that “a nation uses the threat of force against local persons or property
to punish, and thus regulate, extraterritorial acts.”48 To govern
extraterritorially, a U.S. court only needs to raise the threat that a foreign
party may be hauled into litigation in the United States. A foreign firm must
comply with the U.S.-style document preservation at all times (or risk a
disastrous litigation outcome), as long as there is at least some chance of
litigation in the United States. And there is always some chance, because the
U.S. legal doctrine on personal jurisdiction is notoriously far-reaching and
unpredictable.49 If a foreign firm does business with the United States, the
firm simply cannot afford to refuse U.S.-style document forensics because
chances are good that the foreign firm will be subject to U.S. jurisdiction. In
other words, U.S. courts’ extraterritorial discovery orders, set against the
uncertain American legal doctrine on personal jurisdiction, regulate the
document retention behaviors of the corporations outside of the court’s
territorial jurisdiction long before a U.S. court actually establishes personal
jurisdiction over any such corporation.
Canadian bank that a U.S. court order would subject it to conflicting enforcement obligations). See also
discussion infra Section IV.B.3.
47. See Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 828 (if a foreign corporation “voluntarily elected to do
business in numerous foreign host countries,” it “has accepted the incidental risk of occasional
inconsistent governmental actions. It cannot expect to avail itself of the benefits of doing business here
without accepting the concomitant obligations.”).
48. Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 479 (1998) (emphasis added).
49. See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications
for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 171 (2004) (“Although the extensive body of commentary on
federally imposed limitations on state court jurisdiction agrees on very little, the one point of consensus
is that Supreme Court personal jurisdiction doctrine is deeply confused.”). See also discussion on longarm jurisdiction infra Sections II.B.3.b and III.A.1.
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B. The Operation of Equity Extraterritoriality
As discussed above, Equity Extraterritoriality is a concept that eludes a
concise descriptive definition. But through the aforementioned example, one
can discern how the doctrine operates and reaches beyond the court’s
territorial jurisdiction.
Equity Extraterritoriality is an indirect form of extraterritoriality. A
typical Equity Extraterritoriality situation is one in which a court obtains
jurisdiction over a person, and then orders the person to take certain actions
beyond the court’s territorial jurisdiction. In other words, Equity
Extraterritoriality operates in transnational litigation through two links of
control: the court’s control over a person, and the person’s control over an
extraterritorial thing or conduct.50 The first link—the court’s control over the
person—corresponds to personal jurisdiction, i.e. the court’s ability to have
a person appear before the court. The second link—the order that the court
issues on the person—is the province of Equity Extraterritoriality.
Equity Extraterritoriality may arise in two ways, domestic and
international: a court of one state may issue an extraterritorial order binding
persons and conduct in another state, or a U.S. court may issue an
extraterritorial order binding persons and conduct in another country.
Although U.S. jurisprudence views both types as qualitatively the same,
international Equity Extraterritoriality is the more significant problem, as it
is simultaneously less developed than domestic Equity Extraterritoriality and
creates the more significant foreign policy implications.51
The visualization of transnational litigation as a chain with two links
allows one to focus on the nature of the problems posed by Equity
Extraterritoriality. Fundamentally, the problem of Equity Extraterritoriality
is that the application of territoriality principles or, protection against
extraterritoriality, occurs only on the first link, but not on the second.
Through such legal doctrines as personal jurisdiction that largely operate on
a territorial basis and on a presumption against extraterritoriality, U.S.
jurisprudence applies the territoriality principles on the first link of the chain,
the front end of the litigation. Once the court obtains personal jurisdiction
and reaches the second link, there is virtually no application of territoriality
principles in the extraterritorial orders that the court may fashion. To be sure,
the courts are admonished to be circumspect about their ability to enforce
their extraterritorial orders,52 and they do frequently decline to issue

50. See discussion infra Sections IV.B.3. and IV.C.1.
51. See discussion infra Section III.C.4.
52. See Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, 11A FED. PRAC. & P.: CIV. § 2945 (“[V]arious
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extraterritorial orders on this basis.53 However, the court’s sense of
discretion fails frequently, leading to problems typically associated with
extraterritorial application of national laws. Further, as discussed in more
detail below, the problems of Equity Extraterritoriality—the second link of
the chain—puts additional pressure on the first link of the chain, hindering
the internal consistency of the personal jurisdiction doctrine.54
III. HISTORY OF EQUITY EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The term “Equity Extraterritoriality” points to the historical origin of
the court’s indirect extraterritorial authority—namely, the equity tradition.
This section offers a brief history of Equity Extraterritoriality’s doctrinal
development, set against the development of jurisdictional extraterritoriality
to highlight the relative neglect that Equity Extraterritoriality has received.
A. Birth of Equity Extraterritoriality in Pennoyer v. Neff
Equity Extraterritoriality as a doctrine came into being in the landmark
case of Pennoyer v. Neff.55
However, the potential for Equity
Extraterritoriality existed long before the United States was established.
Before the American Revolution, the English equity court freely reached
beyond its territorial jurisdiction—typically, to adjudicate cases involving
lands located outside of England.56 This was in marked contrast to the
common law courts of England, which operated on a territorial basis. It was
held as early as 1280 that common law courts had no jurisdiction to redress
a tort committed abroad.57 It was not until 1605 that a jury was permitted to
determine a foreign fact.58 In the early 17th century, common law courts
began considering cases involving obligations made outside of England, but
considerations may induce [the court] to refrain from exercising this power in certain contexts.”);
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 442 cmt. 2 n.2 (cautioning against ordering extraterritorial
discovery).
53. See, e.g., Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., 731 F.2d 415, 422 (7th Cir.
1984); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 80 (3d Cir. 1994).
54. See discussion infra Section IV.C.3.
55. 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1878).
56. See, e.g., Carteret v. Petty (1676) 2 Swans 324, 324 (Chancery Court ordering accounting waste
in lands located in Ireland); Arglasse v. Muschamp 23 Eng. Rep. 322, 323 (1682) (Chancery Court issuing
bill of relief against annuity charged on Irish lands); Toller v. Carteret (1705) 2 Vern. Ch. 494, 495
(Chancery Court adjudicating a matter concerning mortgage of lands located in the island of Sark, in
Channel Islands); Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1750) 1 Ves. Sr. 444, 447 (adjudicating the boundary dispute
between England’s North American colonies, Pennsylvania and Maryland).
57. See Huge le Pape v. the Merchants of Florence in London, 8−9 Edw. I (1280–1281); Alexander
N. Sack, Conflicts of Laws in England, LAW: CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835–1935 342, 344 (1937).
58. See Dowdale’s Case, 6 Co. Rep. 46(b) (1605); Sack, supra note 57, at 347–48.
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only by relying on a ludicrous legal fiction that a foreign city was actually in
England.59 The early courts of the United States inherited this split attitude
on territoriality, with courts sitting in law operating on the basis of
territoriality60 while courts sitting in equity reaching freely beyond its
territorial jurisdiction.61 Early Supreme Court cases reflect a similar split.
Several early cases (including Charming Betsy, in which the court held “an
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains”) follow the territoriality
principles.62 But in the same time period, the Supreme Court regularly
allowed state courts sitting in equity to reach beyond their territorial
jurisdiction.63

59. For example in Ward’s case, decided in 1625, the plaintiff sued based on a debt on bill created
in Hamburg, Germany. In the judgment entered for the plaintiff, the court declared (presumably with a
straight face): “we shall take it that Hamburg is in London in order to maintain the action which otherwise
would be without our jurisdiction, and while in truth we know that Hamburg is beyond the sea, as judges
we do not take notice that it is beyond the sea.” 82 Eng. Rep. 244, 245 (1624–1628); see also Sack, supra
note 57, at 346.
60. See, e.g., Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786) (holding courts of
Massachusetts lacked jurisdiction against a Connecticut resident because the plaintiff in the
Massachusetts action failed to personally serve process on the Connecticut defendant within
Massachusetts); Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37, 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809); Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky.
(Hard.) 422, 429 (1808). For additional examples of early American, pre-Pennoyer cases that discuss the
court’s territorial jurisdiction, see Weinstein, supra note 3, at 11 (collecting cases).
61. See, e.g., Farley v. Shippen, Wythe (Va.) 254, 265 (1794) (Supreme Court of Virginia ordering
a party to convey lands located in North Carolina); Sanford v. Sanford, 5 Day (Conn.) 353, 358 (1812)
(Connecticut court ordering delivery of personal property outside of the state’s territorial boundaries);
Jennison v. Hapgood, 27 Mass. 77, 110 (1830) (Massachusetts court ordering disposition of property
outside of Massachusetts); Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 606, 621 (1831) (New York court
ordering the defendant to deliver personal property from Cartagena, Colombia); Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige
Ch. (N.Y.) 402, 405 (1831) (New York court ordering the defendant to convey real estate in Connecticut);
McDowell v. Read, 3 La. Ann. 391, 395 (1848) (Louisiana determining the legality of conveyance of
lands located outside of Louisiana); Dickinson v. Hoomes’s Administrator, 49 Va. 353, 439 (1852)
(Virginia court ordering conveyance of real estate in Kentucky); MacGregor v. MacGregor, 9 Iowa 65,
77 (1859) (Iowa court ordering conveyance of real estate in Illinois and Wisconsin); Gardner v. Ogden,
22 N.Y. 327, 332 (1860) (New York court ordering conveyance of real estate in Illinois); Burnley v.
Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474, 477 (1873) (Ohio court ordering conveyance of real estate in Kentucky);
Moore v. Jaeger, 2 MacArth. (D.C.) 462, 471 (1876) (District of Columbia court ordering conveyance of
land in West Virginia); Henderson v. McBee, 79 N.C. 219, 222 (1878) (North Carolina court ordering
conveyance of real estate in Alabama); Seixas v. King, 39 La. Ann. 510, 512 (1887) (Louisiana court
ordering conveyance of real estate in Mississippi); Winn v. Strickland, 34 Fla. 610, 631 (1894) (Florida
court ordering conveyance of real estate in Georgia).
62. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118. Although the canon is phrased as a rule
of statutory interpretation, the territoriality principle that underlies the canon is readily visible because in
the early 19th century, the “law of nations” was almost entirely concerned with the relationship among
territorially sovereign states. See also The Schooner “Exchange” v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
136 (1812) (holding Maryland court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on French warship).
63. See, e.g., Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. 148, 163 (1810) (allowing Kentucky court to compel
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But it was not until Pennoyer v. Neff that the Supreme Court had the
occasion to consider applying the territoriality principles to equitable
remedies, and decided that they did not apply. Accordingly, Pennoyer may
be considered the moment of birth for Equity Extraterritoriality, in which the
doctrine “found its highest expression.”64
The facts of Pennoyer are well-known. Marcus Neff, who was the
plaintiff at the trial level, sought to recover the title of the land in Oregon
that was sold to Sylvester Pennoyer. Pennoyer acquired the land from John
Mitchell, who purportedly obtained title of Neff’s land after prevailing in a
lawsuit against Neff. Unlike Mitchell, Neff did not reside in Oregon, and
never appeared on the lawsuit that Mitchell filed. Mitchell served Neff by
publication pursuant to Oregon law, and won a default judgment when Neff
failed to appear. Therefore, the validity of Pennoyer’s title depended on the
validity of Mitchell’s default judgment. And the validity of the Mitchell’s
judgment, in turn, depended on whether Oregon had jurisdiction over Neff
when Mitchell sued Neff.
Much of Pennoyer is about the application of territoriality principles to
the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. Pennoyer imported its territoriality
principles from Joseph Story, who in turn borrowed and expanded the
territoriality principles of the Dutch jurist Ulrich Huber. Huber’s theory of
territorial sovereignty, under which laws of a sovereign state are effective
within the state’s territory but not beyond, formed the foundation of the
Westphalian international order.65 Story inherited Huber’s principles, and
transformed them into rules limiting judicial jurisdiction along the lines of
territorial boundaries.66 In doing so, Story transformed “intellectual

conveyance in lands located in Ohio); King v. Hamilton, 29 U.S. 311, 311 (1830) (ruling the circuit court
of Ohio, sitting in Equity, may order specific performance regarding land located within the military grant
given by Ohio to Virginia); Watkins v. Lessee of Holman, 41 U.S. 25, 57 (1842) (“A Court of Chancery,
acting in personam, may well decree the conveyance of land in any other state, and may enforce their
decree by process against the defendant.”); Corbett v. Nutt, 77 U.S. 464, 475 (1870) (“A court of equity
acting upon the person of a defendant may control the disposition of real property belonging to him
situated in another jurisdiction, and even in a foreign country.”); Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444, 449 (1876)
(“It is here undoubtedly a recognized doctrine that a court of equity, sitting in a State and having
jurisdiction of the person, may decree a conveyance by him of land in another State, and may enforce the
decree by process against the defendant.”); Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S. 298, 308 (1878) (“Where the
necessary parties are before a court of equity, it is immaterial that the res of the controversy, whether it
be real or personal property, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal.”).
64. Price, supra note 24, at 804.
65. See Alex Mills, The Private History of International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 25–27
(2005).
66. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
241, 260 (1965).
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constructs for critical enlightenment” into the principles of “administering
the law in its intricate routine.”67
The opinion in Pennoyer borrows its jurisdictional principles directly
from Story: “no tribunal established by [a state] can extend its process
beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its
decisions. ‘Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit,’ says
Story, ‘is a mere nullity.’”68 But how is a state to establish the required
jurisdiction over the party? Here, Pennoyer announced the decision for
which it is primarily known today: by serving the defendant personally. This
is the contribution from the English common law concept of territoriality,
which was transplanted to the early American common law courts. Early
American common law courts had a form of territoriality principle whereby
their jurisdiction was established by a service of process effectuated within
the state boundaries.69 In short, Pennoyer grafted the Westphalian
territoriality principles—derived from Huber’s theories, delivered through
Story—onto the jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction, by requiring a
territorial service of process upon a person before the courts may exercise
jurisdiction over that person.
But what about after the court establishes personal jurisdiction? At that
point, do territoriality principles apply to the orders that the court may issue
upon the person over whom the court has jurisdiction? To this core question
of Equity Extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court answered simply: no. In the
middle of propounding the strong territoriality principles inherited from
Huber and Story, the Supreme Court gave this ringing endorsement of Equity
Extraterritoriality:
[T]he exercise of jurisdiction which every State is admitted to possess over
persons and property within its own territory will often affect persons and
property without it. To any influence exerted in this way by a State
affecting persons resident or property situated elsewhere, no objection can
be justly taken.
Thus the State, through its tribunals, may compel persons domiciled
within its limits to execute, in pursuance of their contracts respecting
property elsewhere situated . . . ; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no
manner interferes with the supreme control over the property by the State
within which it is situated.70

The Court concluded this approval of Equity Extraterritoriality by citing a
line of English and American cases that upheld the central thesis of Equity
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 722–23.
See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 10.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723.
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Extraterritoriality: once there is jurisdiction over a person, the court may
reach beyond its territorial borders by way of ordering that person.71
To be sure, Pennoyer’s approval of Equity Extraterritoriality comes in
dicta, and its formulation of Equity Extraterritoriality is the same as the many
prior Supreme Court cases that allowed courts sitting in equity to exercise an
indirect extraterritorial authority.72 But the context in which the formulation
appeared does matter. In the middle of pronouncing perhaps the strongest
statement of territoriality in U.S. constitutional history, the Supreme Court
explicitly carved an exception: as long as the court exercised its power
beyond its territorial jurisdiction indirectly through persons within its
territorial jurisdiction, “no objection can be justly taken.”
According, Pennoyer is the moment where Equity Extraterritoriality
had its doctrinal birth. But of course, the court’s a priori approval of Equity
Extraterritoriality begs the question: regardless of what the Supreme Court
says, there must be some instances where Equity Extraterritoriality does
interfere with another state’s territorial sovereignty as a practical matter.
What happens in those instances? To this day, nearly 140 years since
Pennoyer, the Supreme Court has not given a comprehensive answer.
B. Growth of Equity Extraterritoriality in Early and Mid-20th Century
Pennoyer, decided in 1878, crystallized the split in the application of
territoriality doctrine in the U.S. law: jurisdiction would be delimited by the
territorial boundaries, while equity would reach beyond the territorial
boundaries through persons under the court’s jurisdiction. In the early 20th
century, these two branches would continue stretching in opposite directions.
Two developments from the mid-20th century would accelerate the split
even further: merger of law and equity, and the personal jurisdiction
revolution involving “minimum contacts” and the “effects” test. These two
developments would serve as growth spurts for Equity Extraterritoriality,
which emerged as an even more significant force by late 20th century.
1. Equity Extraterritoriality in the Early 20th Century
The split in the territoriality doctrine caused by Pennoyer continued into
the 20th century: territoriality principles applied to jurisdiction, but not to
court orders thereafter. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., the
Supreme Court applied Pennoyer’s concept of territoriality to legislative
jurisdiction, holding that an act of Congress (in this case, Act to Protect

71. Id.
72. See cases cited supra note 63.
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Trade Against Monopolies) did not apply to injuries occurring outside the
territorial boundaries of the United States. 73 If Pennoyer is not the strongest
statement of territorial sovereignty in U.S. constitutional history, the honor
may belong to American Banana. The Court’s opinion, penned by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, expresses incredulity that anyone would doubt the
idea that American law did not apply beyond the U.S. territorial borders:
[T]he plaintiff’s case depends on several rather startling propositions. In
the first place the acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears,
outside the jurisdiction of the United States . . . It is surprising to hear it
argued that they were governed by the act of Congress.74

Justice Holmes also made clear that sovereignty was the animating principle
of the territoriality doctrine, as he found extraterritorial application of a
Congressional act “would be an interference with the authority of another
sovereign.”75
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court continued to find no
issue with Equity Extraterritoriality, which at this point had received the
blessings of Pennoyer. In the aftermath of Pennoyer, the courts of the United
States continued to approve the Equity Extraterritoriality power to order
disposition of res located outside of the courts’ territorial jurisdiction.76
Commentators from the early 20th century have considered Equity
Extraterritoriality to be a settled doctrine: “It is now firmly established that
the courts of equity of one state can grant an injunction to restrain the
proceedings in another state without interfering with the sovereignty of that
other state.”77
73. 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
74. Id. at 355.
75. Id. at 356; see also Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 290 (1949) (U.S. overtime laws
did not apply outside of the United States, despite the fact that both the employer and the employee were
U.S. nationals).
76. See, e.g., Robertson v. Howard, 229 U.S. 254, 261–62 (1913); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 10
(1909); Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87, 105–06 (1891); Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151, 154–55 (1884);
Lawrence v. Du Bois, 16 W. Va. 443, 455–56 (1880); Shillaber v. Robinson, 97 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1877);
Elizabethtown Sav. Inst. v. Gerber, 35 N.J. Eq. 153, 156–57 (1882); Johnson v. Gibson, 6 N.E. 205, 208
(Ill. 1886); Peters v. Neely, 84 Tenn. 275, 280–81 (1886); Smith v. Davis, 27 P. 26, 32 (Cal. 1891); Davis
v. Cornue, 45 N.E. 449, 450–51 (N.Y. 1896); Noble v. Grandin, 84 N.W. 465, 467 (Mich. 1900);
Pittsburg, C., C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Bartels, 56 S.W. 152, 152 (Ky. 1900); Schmaltz v. York Mfg.
Co., 52 A. 522, 526 (Pa. 1902); Butterfield v. Nogales Copper Co., 80 P. 345, 347 (Ariz. 1905); Banco
Minero v. Ross, 172 S.W. 711, 714 (Tex. 1915); Apple v. Smith, 190 P. 8, 9 (Kan. 1920).
77. Ernest J. Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity Over Persons to Compel the Doing of
Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the State, 14 MINN. L. REV. 494, 495 (1930); see also Charles Levin,
Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts of Chancery, 9 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 399, 407 (1934) (“It is
apparently well-established in this country that, on the theory that the action is purely one in personam,
and not in rem, a court does have equitable power to make such an [extraterritorial] order.”) (italics in
original); Walter W. Cook, The Power of Courts in Equity, Part II, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 106, 128 (1915);
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By the early 20th century, now with Pennoyer’s blessing, Equity
Extraterritoriality would not limit itself to the “classical” situations in which
Equity Extraterritoriality arose in the 19th century—usually, adjudication of
rights regarding a specific real property located outside of the court’s
territorial jurisdiction. As the economy of the United States expanded
throughout North America and beyond in the late 19th century and early 20th
century, there was an ever-greater need for American parties before a U.S.
court to exercise control beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Accordingly, Equity Extraterritoriality would find new expressions with
even greater extraterritorial impact. With Equity Extraterritoriality, courts
of the early 20th century were able to: order a party to deliver physical
evidence located outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction;78 order a party
to stop pursing legal action with a court of another jurisdiction;79 order a
party to engage in a construction project outside of the United States so as to
prevent harmful environmental effects within the U.S.;80 prohibit a non-U.S.
corporation from changing prices outside of the United States, although the
price change was mandated by a foreign law.81 Every one of these
expressions of Equity Extraterritoriality survives to this day.
Spelling, supra note 14, § 8, at 10 (“But a court of equity may enjoin one from prosecuting a suit or
selling property in another state, if justice so requires.”).
78. See , e.g., Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541, 551 (1908) (finding no Due
Process Clause violation when a Vermont grand jury ordered production of defendant company’s books
and records located in Massachusetts); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 443 (1932) (upholding
a contempt judgment over an American citizen residing abroad who refused to comply with a subpoena
in a criminal case).
79. See, e.g., Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 134 (1890) (permitting Massachusetts courts to
enjoin the defendants from continuing the litigation pending in New York). In Cole, the enjoined party
cited Pennoyer to argue against the anti-suit injunction by the Massachusetts court. Quoting the very
language in Pennoyer that approved Equity Extraterritoriality, the court found that extraterritorial antisuit injunctions were permitted. See also Wilson v. Josephs, 8 N.E. 616, 617 (Ind. 1886) (Indiana court
enjoining the defendant from pursuing an attachment action in Illinois); Allen v. Buchanan, 11 So. 777,
779 (Ala. 1893) (Alabama court enjoining a legal proceeding against property in Louisiana); Miller v.
Gittings, 37 A. 372, 376–77 (Md. 1897) (Maryland court enjoining customers from suing a Maryland
broker in New York); Dunlap v. Byers, 67 N.W. 1067, 1071 (Mich. 1896) (Michigan court upholding the
validity of an Ohio court order adjudicating claims over lands located in Michigan); Kirdahi v. Basha, 74
N.Y.S. 383, 384 (1902) (New York court enjoining disposition of property located in New Jersey);
Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 N.Y.S. 87, 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1926) (New York court enjoining
a husband from prosecuting a divorce action in a foreign country).
80. See, e.g., The Salton Sea Cases, 172 F. 792, 819–20 (9th Cir. 1909) (upholding the California
court’s order enjoining a New Jersey corporation from diverting water in Mexico in order to stop the
flooding in Utah). Salton Sea is notable because, although the court had no territorial jurisdiction over
the defendant (a New Jersey corporation), the loci delicti (Mexico), or the damaged res (land in Utah),
the court made the extraterritorial order solely based on long-arm personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
81. See, e.g., Fargo v. Redfield, 22 F. 373, 375–76 (1st Cir. 1884) (prohibiting a Canadian railway
company from adjusting the fares on the rail tracks that stretched into Vermont based on the contract
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The problem caused by the growing split in the application of
territoriality principles was becoming increasingly apparent to courts and
legal scholars of the early 20th century. Regardless of what the Supreme
Court declared in Pennoyer, it was plain that at least in certain circumstances,
Equity Extraterritoriality was inconsistent with the territoriality principle
applied to judicial and legislative jurisdiction, and served as an affront to the
principle of territorial sovereignty. Contemporary scholars were quite
forward in noting that Equity Extraterritoriality allowed a party to do what it
could not under the ordinary application of the territoriality principles.82
Thus, eminent jurists of this time period attempted to find a limiting principle
for Equity Extraterritoriality.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes appears to be the first Supreme Court
justice who paused at the state of the law regarding territoriality. In Fall v.
Eastin, the plaintiff fell on the “wrong” side of Equity Extraterritoriality, as
the plaintiff’s divorce decree from the state of Washington ordered that the
title of the land located in Nebraska should be changed to list the plaintiff as
the land owner.83 The majority opinion by Justice Joseph McKenna decided
the case along the lines of Pennoyer: the Washington court cannot affect the
title of the land in Nebraska, although the plaintiff could have prevailed if
the decree merely ordered the defendant to deliver the title of the land.84
Perhaps mindful of the strong territoriality principle that he announced in
American Banana, decided only seven months prior to Fall, Justice Holmes
penned a concurring opinion to find a place for Equity Extraterritoriality
between the Canadian company and a Vermont rail company, although Canadian law required the fare
adjustment). Fargo is striking because around the same time Fargo was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court
repeatedly held in several railroad cases that courts of one state could not regulate the railway
management of another state. See, e.g., N. Ind. R.R. Co. v. Mich. Cent. R.R. Co., 56 U.S. 233, 246
(1854); Miss. & Mo. R.R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485, 496 (1863); Cent. R.R. Co. v. Jersey City, 209 U.S.
473, 480 (1908). Thus, Fargo is an example of one of the most significant problems of Equity
Extraterritoriality: it allows a court to do indirectly what it is prohibited to do directly. See further
discussion infra Section V.B.2.c.
82. See Cook, supra note 77, at 110 (“We are now in a position to see to what extent these methods
of procedure really differ. In practical effect there is some but only a little difference.”); Messner, supra
note 77, at 528 (“The tendency of the modern decisions is to pay less attention to the state lines, which
formerly were considered insurmountable barriers, and, when the court has personal jurisdiction over the
parties to the suit, to render any suitable decree, directed to and binding upon the parties to the suit, even
to the extent of directing an act to be done outside of the state.”). See also Israel S. Gomborov, ExtraTerritorial Jurisdiction in Equity, 7 TEMP. L.Q. 468, 474–76 (1933) (criticizing early Supreme Court
cases on Equity Extraterritoriality on the grounds that they violate the principle of territorial sovereignty).
83. 215 U.S. 1, 4 (1909).
84. See id. at 8 (“The territorial limitation of the jurisdiction of courts of a state over property in
another state has a limited exception in the jurisdiction of a court of equity, but it is an exception well
defined. A court of equity, having authority to act upon the person, may indirectly act upon real estate in
another state, through the instrumentality of this authority over the person.”).
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within the constitutional structure. To Justice Holmes, the justification for
Equity Extraterritoriality could be found in the Constitution’s Full Faith and
Credit Clause: “A personal decree is equally within the jurisdiction of a
court having the person within its power, whatever its ground and whatever
it orders the defendant to do. Therefore, I think this decree was entitled to
full faith and credit in Nebraska.”85 Justice Holmes, however, found other
defects in the Washington court’s order that disqualified it from full faith and
credit.86
This formulation by Justice Holmes is not a great solution. For one, it
does nothing to limit the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality, as Justice
Holmes would permit the court to reach extraterritorially in “whatever it
orders the defendant to do,” as long as the court has the person “within its
power.” For another, Justice Holmes’ solution would do nothing in the
international context, which has no equivalent of a Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Regardless, Justice Holmes’ concurring opinion in Fall appears to
be the first attempt by the Supreme Court to limit the Equity
Extraterritoriality doctrine with a constitutional mandate. If engaged further,
Fall v. Eastin could have developed into a more robust Equity
Extraterritoriality doctrine that developed within the confines of the Full
Faith and Credit jurisprudence. But not much came of Fall; Justice Holmes’
proposed formulation of Equity Extraterritoriality only led to minimal
further development,87 leading to Justice Breyer’s bewilderment 87 years
later in Baker, where the Supreme Court was asked to ascertain the
relationship between Equity Extraterritoriality and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.88
Judge Learned Hand, another titan of American legal history, tackled
this issue as well. The plaintiff in Amey v. Colebrook Guaranty Savings
Bank filed suit in the U.S. District Court for Vermont to demand accounting
over lands located in Maine.89 In this “classic” Equity Extraterritoriality
case, Judge Hand shrewdly noted that Amey presented the same problem that
Justice Holmes faced in Fall.90 In Amey, Judge Hand took a different tack
from Justice Holmes by explicitly seeking to limit the application of Equity
85. Id. at 15 (Holmes, J., concurring).
86. See id.
87. In Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948), the Supreme Court held that divorce decrees
were entitled to Full Faith and Credit across state borders. But neither Sherrer nor any other Supreme
Court case since Justice Holmes’ concurring opinion in Fall dealt with Equity Extraterritoriality until
Baker in 1996.
88. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
89. 92 F.2d 62, 62 (2d Cir. 1937).
90. See id. at 64 (citing Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 1 (1909)).
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Extraterritoriality. Responding to the argument that the court had
jurisdiction over the defendant, Judge Hand noted:
The word, “jurisdiction,” is in this connection somewhat equivocal; in one
sense the judge had it; the [defendant] had personally appeared and was
subject to his orders . . . But although he thus had the power to prevent the
defendant from asserting its rights in Maine, it might still be improper for
him to do so. Courts do not always exert themselves to the full, or direct
parties to do all that they can effectively compel, and such forbearance is
sometimes called lack of “jurisdiction.”91

With this, Judge Hand was attempting to limit the worst excesses of
Equity Extraterritoriality by limiting the basis upon which a court may issue
an extraterritorial order. For Judge Hand, merely having jurisdiction over a
person would not be sufficient. After detailed discussion of English and
American cases on Equity Extraterritoriality, Judge Hand concluded: “It
would be more nearly true to say that the court may enforce any personal
obligation of the defendant . . . When there is no such obligation, under the
more general rule and the better considered decision, courts will abstain.”92
In other words, Judge Hand would allow Equity Extraterritoriality to reach
beyond the court’s territorial borders to enforce a specific obligation, such
as a pre-existing contract or a judgment by a court, but not a general
obligation such as the duty to avoid waste, as was the case in Amey. This
limitation would have cut down the many branches of Equity
Extraterritoriality to a manageable level—but it was not to be. The only time
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed Judge Hand’s limiting principle was in
Justice John Harlan’s dissent in United States v. First National City Bank,
while the majority of the court continued the path of Equity
Extraterritoriality.93 Beyond that moment of hurrah, Judge Hand’s limiting
doctrine received little notice.94

91. Id. at 63 (emphasis in original).
92. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
93. 379 U.S. 378, 387–388 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“But ‘jurisdiction’ is not synonymous
with naked power. It is a combination of power and policy. Judge Learned Hand made this point in
Amey, a case containing some of the same elements as the case before us.”) (internal citation omitted).
94. Only two federal cases cite Judge Hand’s limiting principle with approval. Gillis v. Keystone
Mut. Casualty Co., 172 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir. 1949); Connell v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 174
F. Supp. 453, 457 (D.R.I. 1959). See also Notes, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM.
LAW INST. 1971) § 55 (citing Amey in a section that allows a state to issue an extraterritorial injunction
as long as the person so ordered is within the court’s judicial jurisdiction).
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2. Two Growth Spurts: Merger of Law and Equity, and the Personal
Jurisdiction Revolution
Equity Extraterritoriality grew and expanded steadily in the early 20th
century, despite attempts by eminent jurists to limit its reach. In the mid20th century, Equity Extraterritoriality would undergo two major growth
spurts that would push its reach even further away from the principle of
sovereign territoriality: merger of law and equity, and the revolution in the
U.S. law’s personal jurisdiction doctrine.
a. Merger of Law and Equity
The merger of law and equity was the first growth spurt for Equity
Extraterritoriality. In the federal system, law and equity ceased to exist as
separate systems in 1938 with the introduction of a uniform Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, while many state courts had done the same several decades
earlier.95 The merger of law and equity represented a “triumph of equity,”
as the post-merger civil procedure derived mostly from equity procedure
rather than common law procedure.96 The triumph of equity in procedure
meant, effectively, that the merger allowed legal remedies to be enforced
through equitable procedures. In the history of Equity Extraterritoriality, this
is the moment at which the term “equity” in “Equity Extraterritoriality”
becomes a historical marker rather than a descriptive term—because after
the merger, courts may apply legal remedies extraterritorially by way of
Equity Extraterritoriality.
The merger of law and equity served to amplify the internal
contradiction in the application of territoriality principles to a new level. In
17th century England, the inconsistency with which common law courts and
the equity court approached the territoriality principle was manageable
because common law and equity played separate and complementary roles:
common law provided the general rules, and equity was an exception
invoked only in extraordinary cases. Eliminating the separation between
common law and equity meant that the principles that served to limit the
application of equity to extraordinary cases would fall away.97 Accordingly,
equity—which was once considered “[a] special doctrine reserved for special
occasions”—became “ordinary, not extraordinary, in remedies, procedure,
and substance.”98 As a result, “the merger of law and equity contributed to
95. See Price, supra note 24, at 811.
96. See Subrin, supra note 31, at 943.
97. See Weinstein, supra note 49, at 171–72 (lacking of understanding as to the historical
background of a legal doctrine leads to a “doctrinal incoherence”).
98. Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53–54 (1993). See
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a greater geographical coverage and type of activity affected than is seen in
equitable decrees of earlier eras.”99
One of the main limiting principles of equity had been that equity acted
only in cases of “irreparable injury,” namely the types of injury for which
there was no adequate remedy at law. But in a court lacking a formal
distinction between law and equity, with a fading memory of what remedy
was legal versus equitable, that limiting principle became a non sequitur.100
Another major limiting principle for equity had been that equity was
confined to the protection of property rights.101 This is one of the reasons
why the “classic” cases of Equity Extraterritoriality invariably involved a
disposition of res of some kind. This limitation, too, essentially disappeared
after the merger of law and equity.102 Even in equity cases that purportedly
stayed within the “property rights” limitation, the concept of “property
rights” was stretched far beyond a disposition of res. The creative expansion
of “property rights” limitation in this time period would allow injunctions to
govern strikes and labor disputes,103 shut down illegal saloons during
Prohibition,104 and defeat racial segregation.105 As the court’s power
also Willis L. M. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IOWA L. REV. 183, 190–91
(1957) (“Equitable relief has now become so common that it can hardly be considered more extraordinary
than relief at law.”).
99. Price, supra note 24, at 812. See also Spelling, supra note 14, at 5–6 (“The range of purpose
for which this remedial writ may be invoked is almost infinite.”).
100. See Price, supra note 24, at 815–16; Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury
Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 609, 692 (1990) (arguing that the original meaning of the “irreparable
injury” requirement was that a party did not have remedy at law, and this original meaning disappeared).
101. See Frederick W. Stevens, Proper Use of the Writ of Injunction: From the Standpoint of Legal
History, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 566 (1908) (“Unless statutes have prescribed otherwise, injunctions issue
only where the controversy concerns property, or property rights, including, of course, contract rights;
and not always then.”).
102. See Knighton v. Knighton, 41 So. 2d 172, 174 (1949) (holding that, in an alienation of affection
case, “[i]t is now well settled here and elsewhere that injunctive relief is not limited to the protection of
property rights, but extends to the protection of personal rights in many fields where no adequate remedy
at law is available.”) (quoting Henley v. Rockett, 8 So. 2d 852, 853 (Ala. 1943)); Everett v. Harron, 110
A.2d 383, 387 (1955) (holding in a racial desegregation case that the “property rights” limitation of equity
is “a generalization more honored in the breach than the observance, and runs counter to the cardinal need
of flexibility in the domain of equity jurisprudence.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
103. See, e.g., Regal Knitwear Co. v. Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd., 324 U.S. 9, 9 (1945). See also Luke P.
Norris, Labor and the Origin of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 462, 482–90 (2017) (recounting the
history of equitable injunctions against the labor movement).
104. Price, supra note 24, at 815.
105. See GARY L. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 97–110 (1982) (discussing the
difference between equitable reliefs in school desegregation cases from the traditional equitable reliefs).
See also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292–
96 (1976) (discussing the “the increasing importance of equitable relief” in issuing forward-looking
equitable remedies to address social issues.).
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deriving from equity grew exponentially following the merger of law and
equity, so did the court’s authority to issue Equity Extraterritoriality orders.
b. Personal Jurisdiction Revolution
Also in the mid-20th century, the U.S. legal doctrine on personal
jurisdiction would undergo a revolution, for the most part upending
Pennoyer’s personal jurisdiction doctrine. Legal realists led this revolution
as a part of their broader attack against formalist assumptions in the law.106
The revolution’s effect was an expansion of the court’s judicial jurisdiction
on the basis of “reasonableness,” covering persons outside of the court’s
territorial jurisdiction.107 In other words, for the first time in U.S.
constitutional history, the territoriality principle would be applied
consistently in favor of extraterritoriality. This harmonization would be over
by the late 20th century, when the Supreme Court began the retrenchment of
personal jurisdiction. But this brief period of harmonization would create a
synergy that propelled Equity Extraterritoriality even farther away from the
court’s territorial jurisdiction. In fact, much of the Equity Extraterritoriality
doctrine’s strength, as it stands today, derives from the jurisdictional theories
of this time.
The expansion of personal jurisdiction came on two fronts: “minimum
contacts” doctrine and the “effects” test. The Supreme Court announced the
minimum contacts doctrine in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,108 a
seminal case that restructured the territorial limitation on personal
jurisdiction that Pennoyer imposed. The Supreme Court famously
announced that a person no longer needed to be within a court’s territorial
jurisdiction to be subject to that court’s judicial jurisdiction; instead, having
“certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” would
suffice.109 Accordingly, the Court found that a Delaware corporation with a
principal place of business in Missouri was properly subject to the
jurisdiction of a court in Washington, as the corporation’s business activities
with the state of Washington were “systematic and continuous.”110 The
Supreme Court would later decide in Shaffer v. Heitner that the “minimum
106. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 35 (2d ed. 1995); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A CounterRevolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 377, 379 (1966).
107. See Austin Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident
Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 13–18 (2006) (describing the rise of reasonableness
standard in the personal jurisdiction doctrine).
108. 326 U.S. 310, 310 (1945).
109. Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 320.
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contacts” test would govern the assertion of in rem and quasi in rem
jurisdiction, in addition to the assertion of in personam jurisdiction.111
The “effects” doctrine traces its genesis to United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America (Alcoa),112 a decision by Judge Learned Hand announced on
the same year as International Shoe. Alcoa represents a union of the
contemporary international law and then-existing domestic law, not unlike
the way Pennoyer was the union between Westphalian territoriality concept
and traditional Anglo-American law. In 1927, the Permanent Court of
International Justice decided the famous S.S. Lotus case, in which it
established a presumption in favor of a nation’s legislative jurisdiction, even
over conduct occurring abroad.113 Meanwhile, since American Banana, the
U.S. Supreme Court has issued a series of cases that chipped away at
American Banana’s territoriality doctrine.114 Drawing from these decisions,
Judge Hand held in Alcoa that it was “settled law . . . that any state may
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends.”115 The “effects” test in Alcoa had an additional element of
intent; unless the party intended to direct the effect to the United States, there
was no jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Sherman Act (the law sub judice in
Alcoa) would not cover a trade between Europe and South America that
incidentally affected the United States.116 The subsequent courts, however,
gradually de-emphasized the intent requirement, requiring only that the
effect be substantial and direct.117 According to Professor John Knox: “By
the late 1960s, there was little or no reason for lower courts to believe that
the presumption against extraterritoriality barred the application of federal
law to connected actions within and without U.S. territory, or to foreign
actions with substantial domestic effects.”118
111. 433 U.S. 186, 195, 207 (1977).
112. 148 F.2d 416, 443–45 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit decided Alcoa by virtue of a
certificate from the Supreme Court, which did not have the quorum to decide the case. See id. at 421.
113. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 16 (Sept. 7).
114. See United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87, 105–6 (1913) (application
of the Sherman Act to an antitrust scheme formed in Canada); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917)
(application of Sherman Act on an antitrust scheme formed in South Africa); United States v. Bowman,
260 U.S. 94, 96–100 (1922) (applying criminal statute prohibiting fraud against a U.S. government-held
corporation in a criminal scheme formed on the high seas); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S.
268, 274–76 (1927) (application of the Sherman Act to an antitrust scheme formed in Mexico); see also
Swaine, supra note 22, at 641–42.
115. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
116. See id.
117. See Swaine, supra note 22, at 642.
118. John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40 SW. L. REV. 635,
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the wisdom of
International Shoe’s minimum contacts test or Alcoa’s effects test;119 it is
sufficient to say that these two doctrinal changes in personal jurisdiction
greatly expanded the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality. The essence of
Equity Extraterritoriality is two links of control: the court’s control over a
person, and the person’s control over an extraterritorial thing or conduct.120
The personal jurisdiction revolution stretched the first link close to its
breaking point. One must remember that, even as Pennoyer approved Equity
Extraterritoriality, it placed an outer limit as to how far Equity
Extraterritoriality could reach by way of its territorial jurisdiction doctrine.
Under Pennoyer, the court could only assert jurisdiction over persons who
were served with process within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.121
Practically speaking, this meant that for the most part, the only way for the
court to reach beyond its territorial jurisdiction via Equity Extraterritoriality
was through the residents of the state in which the court was located.122
Stated differently, Pennoyer limits the court’s extraterritorial reach in equity
to the extraterritorial connections of residents or corporations within the
court’s territorial jurisdiction.
In this sense, the prohibition against extraterritorial jurisdiction in
Pennoyer was one of the last limitations placed on the reach of Equity
Extraterritoriality—because once jurisdiction was obtained, there was no
longer any meaningful check on the distance that Equity Extraterritoriality
might cover. The personal jurisdiction revolution rendered this last
remaining limitation by Pennoyer close to meaningless. With the “minimum
contacts” and “effects” tests combined, the court could (and can today) issue
orders against foreign persons located anywhere in the world.123 For
example: a federal court in New York can first find that it has judicial
jurisdiction over a foreign party—say, from Argentina—that previously
never set foot in the State of New York, based on the finding that the party
has sufficient minimum contacts with New York. Then, pursuant to the well-

638 (2011).
119. For a discussion criticizing the International Shoe rule, see, e.g., George Rutherglen,
International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 347 (2001). For a
discussion considering the merits of Alcoa, see Breyer, supra note 21, at 98−101.
120. See discussion supra Section II.B.
121. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723–26 (1877).
122. An exception would be the relatively rare case of transient jurisdiction, i.e. a case in which a
non-resident is served with process while being within the court’s territorial jurisdiction. See Burnham
v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
123. See Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1455, 1478–79 (2008) (“The effects test thus gives license for near universal jurisdiction.”).
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established principle of Equity Extraterritoriality, the court may issue an
extraterritorial provisional order against the foreign party, prohibiting the
party from taking certain actions in Argentina that would frustrate the object
of the litigation pending in New York. Further, the court can enjoin any third
party from assisting the foreign party to violate the court’s order, no matter
where such person may be located in the world, based on the “effects” test—
in other words, by claiming that such person’s actions would create an effect
of frustrating the court’s order. This example is not a fanciful imagination,
but a close analogue of the actual events that transpired in the New York
court case that attempted to enforce the sovereign debt of the Republic of
Argentina.124 There, a federal court in New York not only enjoined the South
American foreign sovereign, but also European financiers that were doing
business with the foreign sovereign, based on the legal theories outlined
above.125
Pennoyer did approve Equity Extraterritoriality, which reached pretty
far beyond the court’s territorial jurisdiction. But ultimately, Equity
Extraterritoriality under Pennoyer was orbiting around a central gravitational
force: the strong territoriality principle, derived from the Westphalian
principle of territorial sovereignty and the common law tradition. Once the
rebel forces of the personal jurisdiction revolution destroyed that center of
gravity, it had the effect of launching Equity Extraterritoriality beyond the
orbit. Without any legal principle to tie it down, Equity Extraterritoriality
would fly adrift.
C. Deepening Divide Between Common Law Extraterritoriality and
Equity Extraterritoriality in Late 20th Century
The mid-20th century saw a brief period of harmonization in the
application of territoriality principles in favor of extraterritorial reach. This
period of harmonization would end in the late 20th century, as the U.S.
Supreme Court would issue a series of decisions that rejuvenated the strength
of the presumption against extraterritoriality. But this retrenchment from
extraterritoriality would occur only on the side of personal and legislative
jurisdiction. Although the Supreme Court did sporadically address Equity
Extraterritoriality in this time period, such efforts, taken together, did little

124. See discussion infra Sections IV.C.2 and IV.C.3. For general overview of the Argentina
sovereign debt enforcement, see Andrew Pomager, Enjoining Foreign Conduct of Non-Parties: NML
Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 29 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 349, 350 (2015); Karen H. Cross,
The Extraterritorial Reach of Sovereign Debt Enforcement, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 111, 126 (2015).
125. See Cross, supra note 124, at 111.
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to pull back the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality. This resulted in the split
attitudes in the application of U.S. territorial principles that we have today.
1. Jurisdictional Extraterritoriality Retrenches
The expansion of the U.S. court’s extraterritorial jurisdiction,
occasioned by International Shoe and Alcoa, began to reverse by late 20th
century. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court began curtailing the
assertions of jurisdiction that arguably might have passed muster under
International Shoe and/or Alcoa.126 This trend of retrenchment would
accelerate in the 21st century, during which the U.S. Supreme Court issued
a flurry of decisions that would mark the new high point of the doctrine of
presumption against extraterritoriality that was unseen since Pennoyer and
American Banana.127
Kulko v. Superior Court of California, decided in 1978, marks the
beginning of the retrenchment.128 In Kulko, a married couple residing in New
York divorced pursuant to a separation agreement executed in New York.
Thereafter, the wife moved to California and sought to modify the separation
agreement before the court in California. The court in Kulko found that the
California court had no jurisdiction over the husband in New York, explicitly
rejecting the theory that the husband had minimum contacts with California
or engaged in conduct that caused an effect in California.129 Since Kulko,
the Supreme Court regularly decided cases that tended to cut against the
assertion of jurisdiction beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court. In
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the court found that an
Oklahoma state court had no jurisdiction over a New York car retailer who
lacked minimum contact with Oklahoma, although Oklahoma residents
purchased cars from the New York retailer and allegedly suffered injury in
Oklahoma.130 In Rush v. Savchuk, the court held that a Minnesota state court

126. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 90 (1990) (noting that the Supreme
Court has invalidated perfectly reasonable assertions of jurisdiction in a series of cases in the late 20th
century).
127. See also Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1084 (2015)
(noting the recent trend of U.S. courts using the combination of personal jurisdiction doctrine, forum non
conveniens, presumption against extraterritoriality and abstention doctrines to avoid adjudicating
transnational litigation).
128. 436 U.S. 84, 84 (1978). It must be noted that Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958),
the first case since International Shoe and Alcoa that invalidated a state court’s assertion of jurisdiction,
pre-dates Kulko by 20 years. However, Kulko marks the moment where the Supreme Court began the
steady tendency to undercut the reach of the judicial jurisdiction.
129. 436 U.S. at 92–98.
130. 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980).
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could not assert jurisdiction over a case that involved an auto accident in
Indiana between two Indiana residents. Although one of the Indiana
residents later moved to Minnesota and became a Minnesota resident, the
court found that the Indiana defendant did not have sufficient minimum
contacts with Minnesota.131 In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v.
Hall, the court found that a Texas court had no jurisdiction over litigation
arising from a helicopter crash in Peru, which involved a helicopter provided
by a Colombian corporation, notwithstanding the fact that the Colombian
corporation contracted with a Texan company to provide the helicopter.132
In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, the plurality of
the court found that a Taiwanese company is not subject to litigation in
California simply by placing its products in the stream of commerce,
although the Taiwanese company’s product may have caused a fatal
motorcycle accident in California.133 On the same theory, the court
invalidated a New Jersey state court’s claim of jurisdiction over a British
manufacturer of machine tools that allegedly caused personal injury, in J.
McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro.134 In addition, the 2014 case of Daimler
AG v. Bauman significantly curtailed the so-called “doing business” general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations.135
Beginning with E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), the
court also started to focus more specifically on the extraterritorial
applicability of American statutory law.136 Thus, in ARAMCO, the Court
announced that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act did not apply to the
employment practices occurring outside of the United States,
notwithstanding the fact that both the employer and the employee were
American.137 Since ARAMCO, the Supreme Court has used the same logic
to limit the extraterritorial applicability of the Federal Tort Claims Act,138
federal immigrant law,139 the Sherman Act,140 federal criminal firearms
131. 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
132. 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984).
133. 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987).
134. 564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011).
135. 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014).
136. 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991).
137. Id. at 258.
138. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) (holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act
is not applicable to tortious conduct in Antarctica).
139. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (holding that federal
immigration law’s prohibition against returning refugees to countries where they could face persecution
is not applicable to Haitian refugees apprehended on the high seas).
140. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 175 (2004) (holding that the
Sherman Act did not provide a cause of action for a foreign injury caused by a foreign price-fixing
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law,141 and federal patent law.142 The culmination of this trend is the trio of
cases decided in the 2010s: Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd.,143
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,144 and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Community,145 which respectively invalidated the extraterritorial application
of the private right of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, Alien Tort Statute, and private right of action under
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. The typically
incisive pronouncement by Justice Antonin Scalia in Morrison succinctly
summarizes the court’s newly energized disposition against
extraterritoriality: “When a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.”146
2. Equity Extraterritoriality Grows in Neglect
Compared to the zeal that the Supreme Court has shown on
jurisdictional extraterritoriality in the late 20th and the early 21st century, the
Court’s attention to Equity Extraterritoriality in the same time period has
been intermittent at best.
The few cases that addressed Equity
Extraterritoriality are inconsistent in their result, likely because the court
never considered these cases to be dealing with the same, recurring problem
of territoriality and sovereignty. As a result, lower federal courts and state
courts to this day have never truly relinquished the virtually limitless
extraterritorial reach that they gained in the development of Equity
Extraterritoriality in the mid-20th century.
In Baker v. General Motors Corp., the case that confounded Justices
Breyer and Kennedy, the Supreme Court sought to clarify the relationship
between the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Equity Extraterritoriality.147
Baker involved a complicated chain of events and a creative use of an
extraterritorial injunction that is typical of late 20th century Equity
Extraterritoriality. Ronald Elwell, an engineering analyst, sued his former
employer General Motors in Michigan. General Motors counterclaimed, and
the two parties settled with the Michigan court’s approval. As a part of the
scheme, although the scheme may have caused domestic injury as well).
141. See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 394 (2005) (holding that federal law’s prohibition of
felons’ purchasing a gun does not apply when the felony conviction was from a Japanese court).
142. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 458–59 (2007) (holding that federal patent
law is not applicable to software installation outside of the United States).
143. 561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010).
144. 569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013).
145. 136 S.Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016).
146. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
147. 522 U.S. 222, 241 (1998).
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settlement, Elwell and General Motors stipulated to an anti-suit injunction of
sorts: a permanent injunction barring Elwell from testifying in any litigation
involving General Motors. Meanwhile, brothers Kenneth and Steven Baker
were suing General Motors in Missouri, claiming that a faulty General
Motors vehicle killed their mother. The Baker brothers subpoenaed Elwell
to testify in Missouri; the Missouri court allowed the testimony, overruling
General Motors’ objection that the Michigan court order, issued pursuant to
the settlement between Elwell and General Motors, prohibited Elwell from
testifying in Missouri.
The majority opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg began its analysis
by recounting the history of extraterritorial injunction obtained as a part of
the final judgment.148 Classifying the injunction against Elwell as a
judgment was important, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause applied
only to judgments.149 Because the injunction against Elwell was a part of the
Michigan court’s final judgment, it could possibly fall within the ambit of
Full Faith and Credit, requiring the Missouri court to recognize the Michigan
court’s order.150 In this instance, however, the Supreme Court found that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require the Missouri court to follow the
Michigan court’s injunction: “a Michigan court, cannot, by entering the
injunction to which Elwell and GM stipulated, dictate to a court in another
jurisdiction that evidence relevant in the Bakers’ case—a controversy to
which Michigan is foreign—shall be inadmissible.”151 This was because “the
Michigan decree cannot determine evidentiary issues in a lawsuit brought by
parties who were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Michigan court.”152
One can say that Baker is the Supreme Court’s most significant pullback on Equity Extraterritoriality in the late 20th century, but that would not
be saying much. It is true that Baker’s majority opinion holds within it a
kernel that could have grown potentially into a more robust theory limiting
the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality. Indeed, the concurring opinion by
Justice Anthony Kennedy makes this very point.153 Justice Kennedy

148. See id. at 234.
149. See id. at 232 (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel a state to substitute the
statutes of other states for its statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to
legislate.”) (internal quotation omitted).
150. See id. at 234 (“The Court has never placed equity decrees outside the full faith and credit
domain.”).
151. Id. at 239.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 244 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Our decisions have been careful not to foreclose all
effect for the types of injunctions the majority would place outside the ambit of full faith and credit.
These authorities seem to be disregarded in today’s holding.”).
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observed that the formulation by Justice Ginsburg would limit extraterritorial
court orders that are “purport[ing] to accomplish an official act within the
exclusive province of [a sister] State.”154 This limitation could have
potentially grown into some type of limiting principle on the extraterritorial
equitable orders that offend the plenary jurisdiction of another territorial
sovereign. But this potential in Baker never materialized; the law today on
Equity Extraterritoriality is the same as the day when Baker was announced
nearly two decades ago. Further, even if Baker did realize its potential, it
would have covered no more than a quarter of the issues that arise with
Equity Extraterritoriality, as it only would address one-half of the
extraterritoriality issues arising within the United States. That is to say: like
Justice Holmes’ suggestion in Fall, the hypothetical, fully-developed Baker
doctrine would do nothing to extraterritorial court orders whose scope is
international rather than interstate, operating in a world that lacks a
sovereignty-harmonizing device like a Full Faith and Credit Clause. Even
within the domestic setting, the hypothetical Baker doctrine would not
address court orders that are not considered final judgments, since the Full
Faith and Credit Clause only operates on final judgments.155
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund is another late
20th century case in which the Supreme Court could have limited the reach
of Equity Extraterritoriality.156 Grupo Mexicano presented a classic Equity
Extraterritoriality scenario, a disposition of res located outside of the court’s
jurisdiction. One slight difference, however—the lower court in Grupo
Mexicano (i.e. the federal district court in New York) restrained the
disposition of assets located in Mexico by way of a preliminary injunction
prior to the final judgment, to enforce the obligation owed under a simple
contract. This difference was sufficient for Justice Scalia to strike down this
instance of Equity Extraterritoriality. Historically, English equity court
lacked the authority to issue a pre-judgment injunction like this one;
therefore, according to Justice Scalia, the contemporary U.S. courts likewise
lacked the authority, unless there was a statute stating otherwise.157

154. Id. at 243.
155. Thus, for example, the California Supreme Court decided Advanced Bionics Corp. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 697, 700 (2002), a case involving an anti-suit preliminary injunction (as
opposed to a final order) issued by a Minnesota court, without referring at all to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. The court, instead, made its decision “under principles of judicial restraint and comity.” Id.
156. 527 U.S. 308, 319 (1999).
157. See id. at 318–33.

PARK PUBLICATION VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

134

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/5/2017 1:42 PM

[Vol 28:99

Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, criticized this history-based approach,158 as
did many learned commentators.159 For those concerned with the reach of
Equity Extraterritoriality, however, Grupo Mexicano offered some hope.
Like Justice Ginsburg’s formulation in Baker, Justice Scalia’s analysis of
Grupo Mexicano provided a seedling of principle that, if fully grown, could
perhaps govern Equity Extraterritoriality in general. We have seen earlier
that although Equity Extraterritoriality existed in the equity courts of 17th
century England, the equitable extraterritorial remedies at the time served a
complementary role, dispensed only in extraordinary instances in which the
more generally applicable common law did not provide an adequate
remedy.160 Applied consistently, Grupo Mexicano had the potential to grow
into a more robust legal doctrine that regulated Equity Extraterritoriality,
turning back the clock at least to the state of affairs that existed before the
merger of law and equity. However, like Baker, Grupo Mexicano did not
lead to a larger doctrine; it merely cut off one particular extension of Equity
Extraterritoriality, leaving many other branches to continue growing.
At least part of the reason why Baker and Grupo Mexicano failed to
grow into a larger doctrine may be that the Supreme Court did not see Equity
Extraterritoriality as a standalone inquiry. This tendency is evident from the
pair of Supreme Court cases involving extraterritorial discovery: Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court161 and Republic of
Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.162 Both cases show that the Supreme Court’s
respect for sovereignty decreases considerably when the sovereigntyoffending device is a discovery order—something that comes after the
establishment of jurisdiction. One can discern that the Supreme Court did
not recognize Equity Extraterritoriality as a standalone inquiry, because
contrary to Baker and Grupo Mexicano, the Supreme Court extended the
reach of Equity Extraterritoriality in Aerospatiale and NML Capital.
In Aerospatiale, the court engaged in a particularly strained
interpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention to find that the Convention
did not provide exclusive or mandatory procedures for obtaining documents
158. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) at 336 (“In my view, the Court relies on an unjustifiably static
conception of equity jurisdiction. . . . Since our earliest cases, we have valued the adaptable character of
federal equitable power.”).
159. See, e.g., Richard H.W. Maloy, Expansive Equity Jurisprudence: A Court Divided, 40 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 641, 645 (2007); David Capper, The Need for Mareva Injunctions Reconsidered, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2161, 2166 (2005); Stephen Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and
Limitations of Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1297 (2000).
160. See discussion supra at Section III.B.2.a.
161. 482 U.S. 522, 522 (1987).
162. 134 S.Ct. 2250, 2250 (2014).
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and information located in the territory of a foreign signatory.163 In so
finding, the court allowed the parties before a U.S. court to conduct
discovery over material located outside of the United States pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than through the Hague Evidence
Convention.164 The court in Aerospatiale did caution that “American courts
. . . should exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the
danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them
in a disadvantageous position.”165 Lower courts came to ignore this caution,
routinely ordering a foreign person under their jurisdiction to produce
materials located outside of the United States, even if a foreign law
specifically prohibited such a production.166
In NML Capital, the Supreme Court found that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) did not prohibit post-judgment discovery of
sovereign assets by way of subpoenas issued to third parties, no matter where
the asset may be located.167 After finding that the FSIA completely preempted the common law on foreign state’s sovereign immunity, the court
found that discovery on sovereign assets was allowed because the FSIA was
silent on the issue of post-judgment discovery.168 Argentina argued, to no
avail, that such discovery would cover assets that could not be subject to
execution under the FSIA, such as military weapons. The court dismissed
the argument, noting that the party issuing the subpoena would not know
what property Argentina had and whether such property was executable.169
From the perspective of territorial sovereignty, these two cases
represent the apex of Equity Extraterritoriality—a total refusal to honor the
sovereign interest of foreign states. Aerospatiale renders meaningless the
Hague Evidence Convention, a multilateral treaty in which various
sovereigns (including the U.S. executive) came together to agree on a
procedure of gathering extraterritorial evidence in a way that minimizes the
infringement upon their sovereignty. Aerospatiale further allows U.S. courts
to ignore the foreign sovereign’s explicitly stated policy preference, such as
bank secrecy or data privacy. It seems difficult to imagine a way to ignore
the concerns of foreign sovereignty more blatantly than Aerospatiale, but
163. For criticism of the Aerospatiale decision, see George A. Bermann, The Hague Evidence
Convention in the Supreme Court: A Critique of the Aerospatiale Decision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 525, 525
(1989).
164. See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 533.
165. Id. at 546.
166. See Sant, supra note 23, at 183–84.
167. See NML Capital, 134 S.Ct. at 2250.
168. See id. at 2256–58.
169. See id. at 2257.
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against all odds, the Supreme Court managed to find the way in NML
Capital—under which U.S. courts can order a disclosure of property owned
directly by the sovereign, no matter where the evidence for property or the
property itself may be located, overruling the objections that the sovereign
made directly to the court.
D. Taking Stock of the U.S. Territoriality Doctrine Today
Recent Supreme Court decisions and authoritative secondary materials
firmly establish the validity of both jurisdictional presumption against
extraterritoriality and Equity Extraterritoriality. In Baker, Justice Ginsburg
explicitly endorsed Equity Extraterritoriality yet again, with no further
attempt to apply territoriality principles to court orders.170 Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States cautions against
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction,171 while Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws gives credence to Equity Extraterritoriality by attesting to
the court’s power to issue extraterritorial orders affecting persons and things
beyond its territorial jurisdiction.172
Today, there are two broad categories of Equity Extraterritoriality. In
the first category, which may be called “traditional” Equity
Extraterritoriality, the court issues extraterritorial orders based on the
authority derived from traditional equity practice. Examples of traditional
Equity Extraterritoriality include discovery orders,173 post-judgment
turnover orders,174 anti-suit injunction,175 and certain types of preliminary or
permanent injunction that the court may fashion in response to the particular
170. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 235 (“a sister State’s decree concerning land ownership in another State
has been held ineffective to transfer title, although such a decree may indeed preclusively adjudicate the
rights and obligations running between the parties to the foreign litigation.”) (internal citations omitted,
emphasis in original).
171. See, e.g., Restat. 3d Foreign Rel. § 421.
172. See, e.g., Restat. 2d Conflict of Laws §§ 53–55, 65.
173. See, e.g., Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1482 (9th Cir. 1992)
(contempt sanctions issued against a Chinese party for non-compliance with discovery order); Bank of
Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 829 (11th Cir. 1984) (contempt sanction issued against a Cayman Island party
for non-compliance with discovery order).
174. See, e.g., Rogers v. Webster, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 13968 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 1985) (ordering
delivery of stock certificates located in Canada to Michigan); In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1204 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2001) (ordering delivery of bank accounts in Scotland to New
York). Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 12 N.Y.3d 533, 541 (ordering delivery of stock certificates
located in Bermuda to New York).
175. See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., 10 F.3d 425, 433 (7th Cir. 1993) (enjoining
a French party from bringing a claim in a French tribunal that had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute
under French law); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 956 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (enjoining parties from seeking anti-suit injunction in Britain).
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circumstance of the case, pursuant to the court’s inherent power derived from
the equity tradition.176 The second category may be referred to as “statutory”
Equity Extraterritoriality, in which the court issues extraterritorial orders to
extend the reach of a statute or a regulation beyond the U.S. borders. The
statute or regulation in question may or may not include an explicit
authorization for extraterritorial application.
For example, federal
regulations governing embargoes against certain countries,177 or federal
statutes designed to detect tax evasion by U.S. nationals residing abroad,178
explicitly authorize extraterritoriality. In many cases, however, the court
issues extraterritorial orders pursuant to statutes that do not have any explicit
authorization for extraterritorial application.179 In such a case, jurisdictional
extraterritoriality and Equity Extraterritoriality work in tandem to stretch the
authority of the statute beyond U.S. borders: jurisdictional extraterritoriality
provides the court with the basis for extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction,
and Equity Extraterritoriality with the basis for extraterritorial remedies. The
U.S. Supreme Court has done this in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California, when it applied the Sherman Act on the allegedly collusive
scheme on British insurance companies,180 over Justice Scalia’s vigorous
dissent that Sherman Act’s “boilerplate language” is an “insufficient
indication to override the presumption against extraterritoriality.”181
Although Justice Scalia’s insistence on the presumption against
extraterritoriality eventually prevailed in the last decade, Hartford Fire
remains standing as a valid precedent, flying in the face of Morrison’s
admonition that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.”182
Numerous similar examples exist, in which courts have virtually
ignored the presumption against extraterritoriality in statutory
176. See, e.g., Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 702 F.3d 573, 573
(9th Cir. 2012) (issuing preliminary injunction against physically attacking the vessels on the high seas);
Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.Supp. 723, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (issuing preliminary injunction prohibiting
circulation of magazine cover with an unauthorized image of Muhammad Ali in Britain).
177. See, e.g., Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 515.201(b) (1998) (prohibiting a foreign
party from re-selling products from United States to Cuba).
178. See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–74 (2010) (requiring non-U.S.
financial institutions to enter into an agreement with the Internal Revenue Service to identify their
customers suspected of being persons subject to U.S. taxation).
179. See Parrish, supra note 123 at 1474–75 (“if foreign conduct substantially affects the United
States, then extraterritoriality is now often assumed.”).
180. 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993). For criticism of Hartford Fire’s extraterritorial application, see
Swaine, supra note 22, at 678–84.
181. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814.
182. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
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interpretation.183 Many bankruptcy courts have ruled that the automatic stay
provided by the Bankruptcy Code applies extraterritorially,184 although the
automatic stay provision in the Bankruptcy Code contains no authorization
for extraterritorial application.185 Courts have justified this extraterritoriality
by pointing to the Bankruptcy Code’s regulatory aims. For example, Judge
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
automatic stay provision applied to the debtor’s assets located in the
Caribbean because “[t]he efficacy of the bankruptcy proceeding depends on
the court’s ability to control and marshal the assets of the debtor wherever
located”186—although the presumption against extraterritoriality announced
in ARAMCO, and later again in Morrison, makes no reference to the need to
maintain the efficacy of proceedings provided by a statute as a valid ground
for the statute’s extraterritorial application. More frequently, however, the
court does not even give a flawed justification for extraterritorial application
of a statute. In Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association,187 for
example, a New York court enjoined the global distribution of a pamphlet
that contained an unauthorized reproduction of the plaintiff’s artwork
pursuant to New York’s Artists’ Authorship Act, although the New York law
has no reference to extraterritorial application.188 Although the terms of the
injunction make clear that the injunction is to be applied beyond the
territorial borders of the State of New York,189 the court did not address the
issue of extraterritoriality at all.

183. See Parrish, supra note 123, at 1475–76 (discussing cases in which the effects test has
“overpowered” the territoriality assumption).
184. See In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that bankruptcy court’s in
rem jurisdiction over estate property allows an international proceeding to be enjoined pursuant to the
automatic stay); In re Likes Bros SS Co, Inc., 207 B.R. 282, 287 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that
foreign creditor violated automatic stay in arresting Chapter 11 debtor’s vessel in Belgium; U.S.
bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over the vessel); In re Joseph Nakash, 190 B.R. 763, 771
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that an Israeli official who commenced involuntary liquidation
proceedings in Israel against a Chapter 11 debtor violated automatic stay); In re McLean Industries, 74
B.R. 589, 603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that creditor over whom bankruptcy court had personal
jurisdiction violated automatic stay in seizing Chapter 11 debtor’s vessel in Hong Kong); but see In re
Maxwell Communications Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that avoidance under
Bankruptcy Code § 547 does not apply extraterritorially).
185. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Bankruptcy Code section governing automatic stay).
186. Rimsat, 98 F.3d at 961.
187. 745 F. Supp. 130, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
188. See N.Y. Art & Cult. Affr. § 14.03 (McKinney 1990).
189. See Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 148–49.
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IV. PROBLEM OF EQUITY EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Having reviewed the history of Equity Extraterritoriality’s doctrinal
growth, this section offers an analysis of the problems caused by Equity
Extraterritoriality. At its heart, the problem of Equity Extraterritoriality is
the problem of extraterritoriality. Regardless of the U.S. law’s Orwellian
treatment that considers Equity Extraterritoriality to be “territorial,” Equity
Extraterritoriality as a practical matter causes the usual problems associated
with extraterritorial application of a national law—including putting persons
under conflicting legal obligations and straining diplomatic relations. The
changes in modern commerce, which relies greatly on intangible property
without a physical situs, are certain to amplify this problem of
extraterritoriality. Without a guiding principle to rein in the excess of Equity
Extraterritoriality, this pressure caused by increased use of Equity
Extraterritoriality is bound to cause even greater problems, because the
doctrine of Equity Extraterritoriality is far too under-developed to meet the
new challenges posed by the contemporary economy.
A. Measuring the Size of the Problem: the Case of Intangible Properties
Whatever one’s assessment of the doctrine may be, it cannot be denied
that Equity Extraterritoriality has a sterling historical pedigree that
potentially reaches as far back as medieval English law.190 Sometimes a
doctrine’s long history alone is enough to overcome the dubiety of the
wisdom behind the doctrine.191 If Equity Extraterritoriality has been in
operation in the Anglo-American legal tradition for centuries, why is it a
problem now?
The historical trajectory of Equity Extraterritoriality provides some
answers. In the pre-independence English law, it was possible to say that
Equity Extraterritoriality was a gap-filling doctrine, deployed in small doses
when the general rule under the common law and its restrictive territoriality
doctrine caused an unfair result.192 This was arguably no longer true after
Pennoyer, when the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to Equity
Extraterritoriality, and certainly not true after the mid-20th century when law
and equity merged and equity-style orders became commonplace. With the
advent of the modern regulatory state, and the looseness of the “effects” test
of personal jurisdiction discussed above, the courts can potentially apply any
statute beyond the territorial borders of the United States using Equity

190. See discussion supra Section III.A.
191. See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990).
192. See discussion supra Section III.B.2.a.
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Extraterritoriality.193 In other words, the history of Equity Extraterritoriality
is one marked by the doctrine’s increasing reach.
What, then, is in store for Equity Extraterritoriality in the 21st century?
The changes in modern commerce indicate that parties will resort to Equity
Extraterritoriality even more frequently, pushing the reach of the doctrine
even further. Speaking of increasing global commerce may be a cliché, but
the increase does incentivize the persons engaged in international commerce,
as well as the national governments overseeing such persons, to reach
beyond their borders.194 Reliance on Equity Extraterritoriality will only
increase in this environment, in large part because it allows the
extraterritorial reach that jurisdictional extraterritoriality prohibits. Beyond
this general observation, however, one specific feature in the modern
marketplace is expected to drive the growth of Equity Extraterritoriality:
intangible properties.
1. Rise of Intangible Properties
Modern capitalism continuously generates more types of intangible
properties of ever-greater dollar amount and ever-greater level of
abstraction. The days when intangible properties were mostly debts, shares
in a corporation, and simple forms of intellectual property, are firmly behind
us as much as the days when horse and buggy was a common mode of
transportation. Today’s drive for efficient financing means that even
tangible properties are converted into intangible properties, and simple
intangible properties are converted into more complex and ethereal
derivative products. A real estate investment trust (REIT), for example, is
made up of interests in real properties or mortgages in real properties, and its
shares are traded on major exchanges like shares of a mutual fund.195 Thus,
REIT is essentially a device that converts real estate (as tangible a property
as any property gets) into highly liquid securities (intangible property). For
another example, in April 2014, Fantex Brokerage Services completed a $4.2
193. See discussion supra Section III.B.2.b.
194. In the past forty years, the share of world trade in the global economic output has doubled,
going from around 15 percent to more than 30 percent. In the same time period, America’s imports have
increased from 6.4 percent to 16.8 percent of the national GDP, and the exports from 6.7 percent to 13.5
percent. See World Bank, WORLD DATABANK: WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, available at
http://databank.worldbank.org. See also Gunther Handl, Extra-territoriality and Transnational Legal
Authority, BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 3 (Gunther Handl, Joachim Zekoll, Peer Zumbansen eds. 2012) (“a general consensus
exists among experts that the single most significant trait of globalization is a fundamental change in the
time and space dimensions of human existence.”).
195. See generally RICHARD GARRIGAN & JOHN PARSONS, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
(1997).
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million initial public offering of Vernon Davis, then the tight end for the San
Francisco 49ers of the National Football League. Fantex had previously paid
Davis $4 million for the right of 10 percent of Davis’s future earnings,
including the money earned through his NFL contract, endorsement, postcareer broadcasting deal, and so on. Fantex then converted the right in
Davis’s future earnings into shares, to be traded on its website.196 These new
types of intangible properties, as well as the old types, may then be packaged
into derivative products. A collateralized debt obligation (CDO), for
example, packages a massive number of collateralized debts, typically a
mortgage secured by a house, and divides them into several tranches of
securities with different levels of risk and return.197 This packaging can be
repeated multiple times, resulting in financial products called CDO-squared,
CDO-cubed, and so on, to be sold in the financial market in a form that is
radically different from the underlying assets. The net effect of this trend is
the massive growth in the size and complexity of the intangible properties
with murky obligor-obligee relationships—which came back to haunt the
world in the 2008 financial crisis following the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, one of the largest brokers of intangible properties.198
The internet further complicated the issue of intangible properties.
Much of the intangible properties are memorialized in the form of electronic
data. (Indeed, much of the money in the bank in the world today is no more
than an entry in the electronic books.) The data that makes up the intangible
properties can be transferred near-instantaneously around the world.
Focusing on this feature of the internet and intangible properties, some
commentators in the early days of the internet argued that a significant
portion of human wealth might be placed beyond the control of any country,
whose authority was bounded by its territory. They predicted that the
internet would become an autonomous province, unregulable by existing
territorial sovereigns because “efforts to control the flow of electronic
information across physical borders . . . are likely to prove futile, at least in

196. See ESPN, Vernon Davis Stock Hits $12 in Debut, Apr. 28, 2014,
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/10852827/vernon-davis-ipo-gains-20-percent-limited-debut.
197. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN
THE UNITED STATES 128 (2011).
198. To give a perspective: in just four years between 2003 and 2007, the U.S. financial industry
generated nearly $700 billion worth of just one type of intangible property, namely mortgage-backed
securities. See id. at 129. Some of the issuers of CDO additionally issued liquidity puts on CDOs,
creating too long of a chain of obligations for the bank to properly calculate the cost of risk in case of a
contingency. See id. at 137–39.
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countries that hope to participate in global commerce.”199 These predictions,
of course, did not come to pass; as it turned out, these commentators severely
underestimated the ability of Equity Extraterritoriality to control intangible
properties.
2. Controlling Intangible Properties Through Equity Extraterritoriality
Traditionally, courts have dealt with intangible properties by engaging
in a legal fiction: assigning them a situs, pretending that the intangible
property is located at one place but not another. A seminal decision on situs
is Harris v. Balk, in which the Supreme Court found that the situs of a debt
was the location of the obligor.200 In the hundred years since Harris, courts
have continued to designate a situs for each new type of intangible property
that appeared. A copyright, for example, is located at the domicile of the
owner of the copyright.201 Under New York’s “separate entity rule,” a bank
account is located in the particular bank branch that holds the account and
not elsewhere, even if the bank may have numerous branches throughout the
world.202 Membership interest in a limited liability corporation is located on
the person who holds the interest, and travels with the person even if the
person crosses territorial boundaries.203 An Internet domain name is located
at the registry where the domain name is registered, and not elsewhere.204
The function of the situs fiction is to bring the intangible property within
the ambit of territorial jurisdiction. If a court’s power is bounded by its
territorial jurisdiction, these intangible properties must be made to have a
territorial location for the court to be able to regulate them.205 The explosion
of intangible properties in terms of their size, type, and complexity, makes
the determination of situs—and ultimately, judicial control—of intangible
properties resemble an exercise in absurdity and futility. This apparent
199. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—the Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1367, 1372 (1996); see also WALTER B. WRISTON, THE TWILIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY: HOW THE
INFORMATION REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING OUR WORLD (1992).
200. 198 U.S. 215 (1905); but see Aaron D. Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 259, 280–81 (2015) (arguing Harris stands for the proposition that intangible properties have no
situs at all).
201. See, e.g., Pablo Star Ltd. v. Welsh Gov’t, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33846, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
16, 2016).
202. See, e.g., Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 943 N.Y.S.2d 791, 791 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2012).
203. See, e.g., Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 315–16 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).
204. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293, 306 (2d Cir. 2002).
205. In this sense, the situs fiction is not unlike the 17th century common law courts’ insistence that
a foreign city was really in London.
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inability to determine the situs of intangible properties was the basis for the
futuristic predictions of the internet beyond government regulations.206 But
these predictions were wrong, because they ignored the central feature of
intangible properties: their dependence on humans, who are subject to
territorial authority. As it turned out, the territorial state did not really need
to enforce the situs rules to regulate intangible property. To control an
intangible property, the state only has to control the person within its
territorial borders who controls the property.207 Regulatory authorities
around the world have recognized this truth and responded accordingly. In
2014, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) launched an investigation
into the anti-competitive effect of Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia’s
smartphone division. Based on KFTC’s conclusion that Microsoft’s
acquisition of Nokia’s patent portfolio would likely restrain competition,
KFTC and Microsoft ultimately entered into a consent decree whereby
Microsoft committed to license its patents in a non-discriminatory manner.208
It hardly mattered to KFTC that most of Microsoft’s patents—an intangible
property—were “located” outside Korea, as Korean patents were less than
five percent of Microsoft’s patent portfolio.209 KFTC was able to control the
disposition of Microsoft’s non-Korean patents simply by controlling
Microsoft’s presence in Korea.210
The rise of intangible property, and states’ subsequent response, have
significant implications for Equity Extraterritoriality. Recall that the
regulation of intangible properties through two links of controls—
controlling the person who controls the property—is precisely how Equity
Extraterritoriality works.211 In Equity Extraterritoriality, the court controls a
person through exercise of jurisdiction, and the court orders the person to
take an extraterritorial action, often with respect to property located outside

206. See Johnson & Post, supra note 198, at 1371–72 (using the example of intellectual property to
discuss the predicted changes in private property interest).
207. See Paul B. Stephan, Courts on Courts: Contracting for Engagement and Indifference in
International Judicial Encounters, 100 VA. L. REV. 17, 57 (2014) (“Even electronic events have a
location, because the person who commands such events exists somewhere.”); Goldsmith, supra note 48,
at 476 (“The Internet is not, as many suggest, a separate place removed from our world. . . . Territorial
sovereignty supports national regulation of persons within the territory who use the Internet.”).
208. See John A. Jurata & Inessa M. Owens, A New Trade War: Applying Domestic Antitrust Laws
to Foreign Patents, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1127, 1139–43 (2015).
209. See id. at 1141 note 83.
210. For general discussion on how one regulatory state may regulate beyond its borders by dint of
the size of its market and other considerations, see Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U.L. Rev.
1, 10 (2012).
211. See discussion supra Section II.B.

PARK PUBLICATION VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

144

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/5/2017 1:42 PM

[Vol 28:99

of the court’s territorial jurisdiction—which is, in the case of intangible
properties, nowhere. Two specific implications are notable.
First, resorting to Equity Extraterritoriality to control intangible
properties effectively discards the situs fiction. There are many good reasons
to abandon the situs fiction, an “intellectual disaster” rife with conflicting
legal theories that are ill-suited for the modern market.212 But the situs fiction
does serve one useful function: applying the territoriality principles upon
intangible properties. In an ideal world, the situs fiction would be replaced
by a global regime that harmonizes the plenary jurisdiction over intangible
properties. In our less-than-ideal world with no such regime,213 discarding
the situs fiction and relying instead on Equity Extraterritoriality to regulate
intangible properties invites clashes with foreign sovereigns, because the
ethereal nature of intangible properties allows multiple states to make
plausible claims of plenary jurisdiction over them.214 Today, in the case of
most intangible properties that have more than de minimis value, the
purchase, sale, creation and use of those intangible properties occur in
multiple countries. The following hypothetical situation is typical: a U.S.
video game company and a Japanese video game company jointly create an
augmented-reality game that collects the player’s location data, and sells the
game in Australia.215 The Australian videogame player’s every movement
(tracked by player’s GPS navigation system embedded in her smartphone) is
stored in the data center located in Canada. Depending on the particularities
212. Simowitz, supra note 200, at 270, 284–292.
213. Arguably, one subset of intangible properties—intellectual property—is subject to such a global
regime, based on the numerous international treaties on intellectual property. See World Intellectual
Property Organization, WIPO-Administered Treaties, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/. But the
example with Microsoft and KFTC indicates the weakness of this regime to a state governing the
intellectual property “located” beyond its territorial jurisdiction by controlling the party who controls
such intellectual property. In addition, the virtually limitless nature of Equity Extraterritoriality means
the U.S. court may even override the executive branch’s decision to entire into such treaties. See, e.g.,
Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. 522, 522 (1987) (finding that the Hague Evidence Convention is not the exclusive
means of conducting discovery abroad, effectively allowing extraterritorial discovery through ordinary
civil procedure). See also discussion supra Section III.C.2.
214. I do not consider multiple claims of plenary jurisdiction per se to be a problem. Rather, the
problem arises from the fact that it is a single district court, rather than the political branches, that is
making the claim of plenary jurisdiction. See further discussion infra at Section IV.2. Professor Aaron
Simowitz, who advocates for discarding the situs fiction, anticipates this issue and proposes a similar
solution for intangible properties as I do for Equity Extraterritoriality—namely, a conflict of laws-based
approach. See Simowitz, supra note 200, at 292–323.
215. This example is loosely based on Pokémon GO, an augmented-reality game that is considered
one of the most successful mobile apps of all time. See Sarah Perez, Pokémon Go Installed on More
Devices than Candy Crush, LinkedIn, Lyft, Tinder & More, TECHCRUNCH, July 14, 2016,
https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/14/pokemon-go-installed-on-more-devices-than-candy-crush-linkedinlyft-tinder-more/.
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of a potential legal claim, any two or more of Australia, Canada, Japan and
the United States can plausibly assert plenary jurisdiction over the intangible
property in this scenario—namely, data created by the physical movements
of Australian gamers. If a U.S. court does seek to control this data, it is likely
to rely on Equity Extraterritoriality, since it has personal jurisdiction over the
U.S. Company that has the ability to control the data’s disposition. For
example, a U.S. court may issue a subpoena compelling the U.S. Company
to produce the location data of a certain Australian individual who plays the
game. Unless the Equity Extraterritoriality doctrine is modified to
accommodate the interests of foreign sovereigns—in this case, interest of the
Australian government to protect the privacy of its citizens’ movement data,
the interest of the Canadian government to manage the data that is housed
within its territorial jurisdiction, and the interest of the Japanese government
to regulate a company incorporated and doing business within its territory—
the regulation of intangible properties is likely to become a free-for-all
endeavor in which “economic might is right.”216
Second, regulating intangible properties through Equity
Extraterritoriality does not only direct the court’s authority to the ultimate
owner of the intangible property, but also to the property’s entire chain of
custody. To a much greater degree than tangible properties, intangible
properties rely on intermediary custodians. (You can own and keep a gold
bar under your physical possession, but you cannot own a bank account
without a bank.) In the many instances in which the owner of intangible
property is not amenable to the court’s jurisdiction, the court will simply
assert jurisdiction over the intermediary that is within the court’s jurisdiction
to control the disposition of the intangible property. In addition, as discussed
earlier, the court will also assert jurisdiction over any intermediary that may
potentially interfere with its orders, even if the intermediary has no other
contact with the forum.217
Such exercise of Equity Extraterritoriality applied to third parties can
very quickly become abusive. Simply being haled to court incurs cost on
third parties. They have no stake in the lawsuit, but they must appear lest
they should become subject to double liability.218 As discussed above, third
parties who would be ordinarily beyond the court’s jurisdiction are haled to

216. J.S. Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside of the United States: A
View from Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 195, 213 n.46 (1978) (quoting a Canadian governmental
official protesting the application of U.S. antitrust laws on Canadian corporations).
217. See discussion supra Sections II.A., III.B.2.b.
218. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3.
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the court based on the most tenuous claim of jurisdiction.219 In the Argentina
sovereign debt case, the Southern District of New York did not simply
prohibit Argentina from paying one group of creditors versus another; the
court also specifically enjoined a number of intermediaries who serviced
Argentina’s bond payments, including Euroclear S.A./N.V. of Belgium and
Clearstream Banking S.A. of Germany and Luxembourg.220 These
intermediaries were located in Europe, and had no contact with New York
in relation to the Argentina case except indirectly through their relationship
with the Republic of Argentina.221 The New York court’s sole basis of giving
this order to the European intermediaries was that they might interfere with
the court’s own extraterritorial order. The Second Circuit’s reaction to this
bootstrapping claim of jurisdiction was a dismissive hand-wave: “By
naming certain foreign payment system participants . . . the district court
was, again, simply recognizing the automatic operation of Rule 65 [of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].”222 Although the district court issued an
order that, in all practicality, governed parties outside of New York and
regulated their conducts occurring entirely outside of the court’s territorial
jurisdiction, the Second Circuit did not consider the issuance of the order to
be an exercise of jurisdiction: “the amended injunctions enjoin no one but
Argentina . . . If others in active concert or participation with Argentina are
outside the jurisdiction or reach of the district court, they may assert as much
if and when they are summoned to that court.”223
To return to this section’s initial question: if Equity Extraterritoriality
has been in operation in the Anglo-American tradition for centuries, why is
this a problem now? One answer is that the use of intangible property will
only increase in the coming decades of globalized commerce, which will
likely lead to greater reliance on Equity Extraterritoriality. Through Equity
Extraterritoriality, the courts will reach even farther beyond their territorial
jurisdiction, to adjudicate upon property of astronomical value and persons
219. See discussion supra Section III.B.2.b., infra Section IV.C.3.
220. See NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
2012), aff’d, 727 F.3d 230, 244 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819, 2819 (2014).
221. See Brief for Non-Party Intervenors Euro Bondholders at 16–20, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic
of Argentina (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013), No. 12-105, Dkt. No. 702.
222. NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 244 (2d Cir. 2013).
223. Id. In an Equity Extraterritoriality case following NML Capital, the Second Circuit made an
extremely fine distinction—one that cannot be sustained in my view—that while issuing an order against
extraterritorial third parties does have the effect of compelling them to act, but is not an exercise of
jurisdiction. See Gucci Am. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122, 129–130 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Granted, once a
district court issues a preliminary asset freeze order enjoining parties over whom it has jurisdiction, that
injunction automatically forbids others . . . But such injunctions do not directly restrain the conduct of
nonparties.”).
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who are not even parties to the litigation. This is the scale of the problems
of Equity Extraterritoriality that we may expect to face, based on the
anticipated growth and spread of intangible property.
The future of global commerce will expose the flaws of Equity
Extraterritoriality even more and make them worse. What, then, are the flaws
of Equity Extraterritoriality?
The doctrinal problems of Equity
Extraterritoriality may be divided into two broad categories: (1) problem of
extraterritoriality, namely the problems arising from the extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws, and; (2) problem of under-development, i.e. the
problems arising from the fact that there are very few limitations on the reach
of Equity Extraterritoriality. The paper examines each category in turn.
B. First Problem of Equity Extraterritoriality: Problem of Extraterritoriality
By allowing U.S. courts to reach beyond U.S. borders, Equity
Extraterritoriality causes problems usually associated with extraterritoriality,
which may be categorized into three interrelated types: (1) interference with
the interest of a foreign sovereign; (2) strife in diplomatic relations; and (3)
conflicting legal obligations.
1. Interference with Foreign Sovereign Interest
Equity Extraterritoriality may infringe upon the interests of a foreign
sovereign proper. U.S. courts regularly issue extraterritorial orders directly
against foreign sovereigns. The Argentina bond litigation, of course, is the
famous example.224 In another recent example, the federal court for the
District of Maryland issued an anti-suit injunction directly against the
Republic of Korea, prohibiting it from pursuing litigation in the Korean
courts against a U.S. defense contractor regarding a contract to upgrade
Korea’s F-16 fighter jets.225 When foreign sovereigns refuse to comply with
a U.S. court’s Equity Extraterritoriality orders, the courts have held the
foreign sovereigns in contempt. The federal court for the District of
Columbia, for example, held the Russian government in contempt for failing
to return religious books and artifacts, located in Russia, to a Jewish religious
organization in New York.226
224. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 254–55.
225. See BAE Sys. Tech. Solution & Servs. v. Republic of Korea’s Def. Acquisition Program
Admin., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94028 (D. Md. July 19, 2016).
226. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Fed’n, 915 F.Supp. 2d 148, 155 (D.
D.C. 2013). See also FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Republic of Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (holding Congo in contempt for failing to cooperate in post-judgment asset discovery); Autotech
Techs. LP v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., 499 F.3d 737, 752 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding the district court
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More commonly, Equity Extraterritoriality infringes upon a foreign
sovereign’s regulatory or adjudicatory interests. A foreign sovereign, for
example, may have an interest in protecting data and information originating
from its territory. There is a significant amount of governmental interest in
prescribing the extent to which sensitive personal data, such as medical or
financial information, becomes available to third parties. Accordingly, a
number of countries passed laws concerning bank secrecy and data
privacy.227 Some countries passed “blocking statutes” specifically to express
their disapproval of the U.S.-style extraterritorial discovery.228Yet the U.S.
law on extraterritorial discovery does not merely disregard the foreign law
regarding bank secrecy or data privacy, but overrules them as illegitimate.229
In doing so, the U.S. law all but made a dead letter out of a multilateral Hague
Evidence Convention that the United States bargained for and signed—a
“truly unprecedented attack on the basic mechanism of international
treaties.”230 Another example is anti-suit injunctions issued by a U.S. court,
which deprive the jurisdiction of a foreign court over the same matter, and
sometimes lead to “inter-jurisdictional judicial warfare.”231
2. Strife in Diplomatic Relations
Because Equity Extraterritoriality infringes upon a foreign sovereign’s
interest, it frequently causes diplomatic strife. The Argentina bond case,
litigated before a New York federal court, provided anti-American fodder to
Argentina’s politicians.232 Reporters for the Restatement have noted the
level of friction and acrimony caused by extraterritorial discovery orders.233
had jurisdiction to issue a contempt judgment against an instrumentality of the government of Belarus
while overturning the contempt judgment on the merits).
227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., § 442, n.1 (Am.
Law Inst. 1987); Christopher Kuner, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS §§ 3.12–
3.36 (2d ed. 2007).
228. See Mark A. Cotter, The Hague Convention: Selfish U.S. Interpretation Aggravates Foreign
Signatories and Mandates Changes to Federal Discovery Rules, 6 FLA. J. INT’L L. 233, 243 (1991).
229. See Sant, supra note 23, at 213–19.
230. Bermann, supra note 162, at 545.
231. George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 631 (1990). See also George A. Bermann, Parallel Litigation: Is Convergence
Possible?, 13 Y.B. Pvt. Int’l L. 21, 29 (2011) (“The fact that anti-suit injunctions are addressed to private
parties, and never to foreign courts themselves, does not minimize either their impact . . . or their potential
offensiveness to foreign States.”).
232. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, In Court Battle, a Game of International Brinksmanship with
Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2012, at B11.
233. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., § 442, n.1 (Am. Law
Inst. 1987) (“No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of
the United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation and
litigation in the United States.”).
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Extraterritorial orders issued pursuant to U.S. antitrust laws have “provoked
the loudest and most consistent foreign protests.”234 Discussing American
antitrust laws, a Canadian government official did not mince words: “For
one government to seek to resolve the conflict in its favor by invoking its
national law before its domestic tribunals is not the rule of law but an
application, in judicial guise, of the principle that economic might is
right.”235 Foreign governments would file amicus curie briefs objecting to
U.S. extraterritoriality, but the U.S. court’s deference to such views is not
consistent. The In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation opinion is an example of
hostility, in which the Seventh Circuit called the governments of Australia,
Canada, South Africa, and the United Kingdom “surrogates” of the foreign
corporation defendants who “subversively presented for them their case.”236
The Uranium court’s hostility toward the foreign states prompted the State
Department to inform the court that the opinion “has caused serious
embarrassment to the United States in its relations with some of our closest
allies.”237
It is a significant problem that the unelected judiciary, which is often a
state court or a federal court applying state law, is effecting foreign policy
consequences. When a court issues an extraterritorial order, it is conducting
an indirect type of diplomacy against its constitutional mandate.238 The
problem is worse when a state law is involved. Territoriality principles
prohibit a state law from being applied beyond state borders, much less
beyond U.S. borders.239 Yet under Equity Extraterritoriality, a state law may

234. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L.85, 122 (1998).
235. Stanford, supra note 214, at 213 n.46.
236. 617 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1980). In many cases including this one, the extraterritoriality
dispute in antitrust is framed as a dispute over jurisdictional extraterritoriality rather than Equity
Extraterritoriality. But in case of “statutory” Equity Extraterritoriality, the question of jurisdictional
extraterritoriality inevitably leads to the question of Equity Extraterritoriality, because once the court
obtains jurisdiction, it is virtually certain that it will issue an extraterritorial order, should the court find
liability. See discussion supra Section III.D.
237. Letter from Legal Advisor Roberts Owen to Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield
dated Mar. 17, 1980, reprinted in part in Marian L. Nash, U.S. Practice, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 657, 665–67
(1980).
238. See Steven A. Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the Sherman Act:
Encouraging the Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 130, 134–39 (1982)
(criticizing the potential entanglement with the U.S. courts with international politics through
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws).
239. See, e.g., Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (striking down
local taxes on shipping containers because foreign commerce is “preeminently a matter of national
concern.”); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 556 (1973) (holding a state’s copyright power ended
at its borders).
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be applied anywhere in the world, causing diplomatic strife with foreign
sovereigns.
3. Creation of Conflicting Legal Obligations
A different type of problem involving Equity Extraterritoriality is where
there is a breakdown in one of the two links of control through which the
doctrine operates—the court’s control over the person, and the control of the
person ordered over the extraterritorial action or properties.240 This problem
is different from the two problems identified above in that it is not a state-tostate issue, but an issue facing the person appearing before the U.S. court.
The court may order a person to take certain extraterritorial action, but the
person’s ability to execute the action may be compromised—which causes a
problem, as the person becomes unable to carry out the court’s order. One
of the ways in which the person’s control over extraterritorial action or
property may be compromised is the presence of a foreign legal obligation;
that is to say, the extraterritorial action to be accomplished, or the
extraterritorial property to be disposed of, may be subject to competing legal
obligations or conflicting foreign regulations. In these cases, the person must
make an in terrorem choice between disobeying the U.S. court and violating
foreign law or obligation.
U.S. courts can be quite cavalier about this dilemma. Courts of New
York have developed a “strong and perhaps surprising”241 tradition of
summarily dismissing claims of double liability by banks, curtly finding that
“[i]f the Bank cannot, as it were, serve two masters and comply with the
lawful requirements both of the United States and [a foreign country],
perhaps it should surrender to one sovereign or the other the privileges
received therefrom.”242 U.S. courts routinely order foreign parties who are
subject to foreign bank secrecy or data privacy law to break that law, so that
the opposing party may conduct discovery over evidence located abroad.243
240. See discussion supra Section II.B.
241. Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, supra note 199, at 308 n.180 (parenthesis omitted).
242. First Nat’l City Bank, 271 F.2d 616, 620; See also Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 978 F. Supp.
2d 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“it is well established that banks assume the risk of double liability as an
ordinary cost of doing business in multiple jurisdictions.”).
243. See, e.g., AstraZeneca LP v. Breath Ltd., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42405 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2011)
(ordering the plaintiff to produce documents protected by Sweden’s Trade Secret Protection Act); Gucci
Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20834 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (ordering a bank to
produce Malaysian bank records in violation of Malaysian bank secrecy laws); Reino de Espana v. Am.
Bureau of Shipping, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54112 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006) (ordering a party to produce
records from a criminal proceeding in Spain in violation of Spain’s Law of Criminal Procedure). See
also Sant, supra note 23, at 181 (noting “court-ordered law breaking” as to discovery “has increased at
an exponential rate,” as sixty percent of all court orders ordering violation of foreign laws have occurred
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In many cases, it is the exercise of Equity Extraterritoriality that compounds
the problem of conflicting legal obligations. For example, foreign
governments have responded against extraterritorial discovery orders and
antitrust injunctions by passing blocking statutes.244 These blocking statutes
create conflicting legal obligations for foreign or multinational parties—
which, again, the U.S. courts frequently ignore.245
C. Second Problem of Equity Extraterritoriality: Problem of UnderDevelopment
The second problem associated with Equity Extraterritoriality is that of
under-development. Extraterritorial application of U.S. law per se is not the
only issue; after all, there are many situations in which a U.S. court’s
extraterritorial reach may be warranted.246 After all, the core intuition behind
Equity Extraterritoriality is defensible under the traditional principles of
territoriality: the court is merely exercising its power over persons and
properties found within its territorial jurisdiction.
Problems of
extraterritoriality arise when the court begins to over-stretch this core
intuition to a point that it interferes with another state’s power over that
state’s territorial jurisdiction. Theoretically, when the court does reach
extraterritorially, it is supposed to exercise discretion and modulate the reach
of its orders. It is received wisdom that “if the requested decree would
interfere seriously in some way with the sovereignty of another state, the
injunction should be denied.”247 But because Equity Extraterritoriality as a
doctrine is so severely underdeveloped, this admonition lacks the legal
structure to rigorously rein in the excess of Equity Extraterritoriality.
Specifically, Equity Extraterritoriality’s underdevelopment leads to
four major issues: (1) practical over-extension of Equity Extraterritoriality;
(2) inconsistency in the application of territoriality principles; (3) fostering
inconsistency in jurisdictional territoriality, and; (4) transnationality
blindness.

between 2010 and 2015).
244. See Cotter, supra note 228, at 243; Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S.
Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 505, 505 n. 3 (1998); Carl A. Circa,
Jr., The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT’L L. 247, 247
(1982).
245. See Sant, supra note 23, at 213–19.
246. For example, a U.S. court must be able to enforce a trade embargo against an enemy state,
regardless of the fact that doing so may require the court to reach beyond its territorial jurisdiction. See
discussion infra Section V.A.2.c.
247. Wright and Miller, 11A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2945.
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1. Practical Over-Extension of Equity Extraterritoriality
Earlier, we noted how Equity Extraterritoriality leads to problems when
the control of the person ordered by the court over the extraterritorial action
or property is compromised. As discussed earlier, one of the ways in which
such control is compromised is when there is a competing legal obligation.248
Another way in which the control may be compromised—and cause
problems with Equity Extraterritoriality—is when the person ordered by the
court lacks practical control. This often occurs with intangible properties
whose existence, as noted earlier, depends greatly on third party
intermediaries who act as custodians of the intangible properties.249 These
third parties may have constructive control over the intangible properties, but
not necessarily practical control. When a third party becomes subject to
Equity Extraterritoriality in such a situation, the harm is felt far beyond the
third party itself, and threatens the stability of the whole system that manages
the existence of the intangible property.
This happened in the notorious Winter Storm Shipping Ltd. v. TPI, in
which the Second Circuit considered whether electronic fund transfers
(EFTs) passing momentarily through New York were attachable property
under Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime
Claims.250 An EFT, the intangible property at issue in Winter Storm,
typically involves an intermediary bank, especially when the EFT crosses
the national border. In most cases, the intermediary bank processes the EFT
in several hours. The Second Circuit ruled that, because the funds were
located in New York in that small window of time, they were attachable by
serving a restraining notice to the intermediary bank located in New York—
regardless of the fact that both the sender and the recipient of the EFT might
be outside of New York. In doing so, the Second Circuit created another
type of Equity Extraterritoriality situation: adjudicating the claims of the
parties outside of its jurisdiction by asserting jurisdiction over a third party
intermediary and the property under the intermediary’s (constructive)
control.
It is not an exaggeration to say that if the holding in Winter Storm had
been pushed to the fullest extent allowed by the current Equity
Extraterritoriality doctrine, banking in New York as we know it would have
ceased to exist. Just a small taste of the coming doom was enough for the
Second Circuit to completely reverse its course just seven years later, in

248. See discussion supra Section IV.B.3.
249. See discussion supra Section IV.A.2.
250. Winter Storm Shipping v. TPI, 310 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 2002).
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Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas PTE Ltd.251 The Second Circuit’s
opinion in Jaldhi, explicitly overturning Winter Storm, is a rare display of
judicial self-flagellation. The court noted that, thanks to Winter Storm, onethird of all lawsuits filed with the Southern District of New York were Rule
B maritime attachment applications.252 Every day, major banks were served
with 800 to 900 restraining notices from creditors who issued multiple
restraining notices throughout the day in hopes to stop the EFT in the few
hours that the intermediary banks took to process the transfer.253 The sheer
volume of the restraining notices caused so many false identifications of the
transfer to be restrained that it disrupted the entire process of electronic fund
transfer.254 The court noted that this uncertainty threatened New York’s
standing as a center of international banking, and even the status of the U.S.
dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency, as foreign corporations
avoided wiring money through New York in dollar-denominated EFTs.255
But the self-flagellation in Jaldhi is not the only remarkable aspect of
the opinion. Jaldhi is also remarkable in that it had very little legal analysis
for an opinion that so completely disavows the governing precedent decided
only years earlier. The court in Jaldhi found that Winter Storm should not
have relied on United States v. Daccarett,256 a Second Circuit precedent on
criminal forfeiture. But the opinion in Jaldhi provides no legal explanation
as to why Winter Storm was wrong to rely on Daccarett, a valid Second
Circuit precedent; the opinion only points to the long recitation of Winter
Storm’s “unforeseen consequences.”257 A more robust doctrine of Equity
Extraterritoriality could have provided the missing explanation. If the court
had recognized its exercise of Equity Extraterritoriality was in fact an
extraterritorial application of the U.S. law, it would have been more cautious
in issuing an opinion like Winter Storm that, in all practicality, adjudicated
the obligations between two foreign parties. If territoriality principles
applied to Equity Extraterritoriality, the court in Winter Storm would have
treaded cautiously, giving due deference to the foreign interests involved.
But that is not the state of the Equity Extraterritoriality doctrine today; the
Second Circuit could not offer any legal reasoning in Jaldhi because Equity
251. Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas PTE Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2009).
252. See id.
253. See id. (quoting Cala Rosa Marine Co. Ltd. v. Sucres et Deneres Group, 613 F. Supp. 2d 426,
431–32 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
254. See id.
255. See id. at 61–62.
256. 6 F.3d 37, 59 (1993).
257. See Jaldhi, 585 F.3d 58 at 62; see also id. at 68 (“Upon further consideration, we find Winter
Storm’s reasons unpersuasive and its consequences untenable.”).
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Extraterritoriality has no limiting principle other than the court’s own sense
of discretion. Thus, when its sense of discretion malfunctioned, the court
could only point to the disastrous consequences that came as a result of its
decision, rather than a principled, legal reason why its decision was wrong.
2. Inconsistent Application of Territoriality
It is worth repeating that U.S. law’s concern with territoriality is almost
entirely focused on the area of judicial and legislative jurisdiction. U.S.
legal doctrine on jurisdiction operates under the presumption against
extraterritoriality, and treads gingerly when the U.S. law does assert
jurisdiction beyond the U.S. borders, lest it should infringe upon the province
of a foreign sovereign. Equity Extraterritoriality, in contrast, has no such
concern—which means Equity Extraterritoriality allows a party to achieve
what it could not under the ordinary application of territoriality principles.
This has been true of Equity Extraterritoriality since the early days of the
United States: a court may order a debtor to deliver a property located
beyond the court’s territorial border to satisfy a debt, although the court
could not change the title of the extraterritorial property.258 This is a facile
distinction that many commentators have criticized for more than a hundred
years.259 As Professor Linda Silberman aptly put it, the distinction makes
the absurd claim that “an accused is more concerned with where he will be
hanged than whether.”260 Yet the Supreme Court continues to maintain this
distinction, explicitly stating in Baker that “a sister State’s decree concerning
land ownership in another State has been held ineffective to transfer title,
although such a decree may indeed preclusively adjudicate the rights and
obligations running between the parties to the foreign litigation.”261
Sophisticated parties and their attorneys are exploiting this gap between
the two doctrines. The Argentina bond case is the most sensational example.
Under the FSIA, which is an expression of the principle of sovereign
immunity that underlies territoriality principles, a foreign sovereign enjoys
immunity from execution against its property located outside the United
States.262 The court bypassed this immunity by issuing an injunction against
the Republic of Argentina, effectively compelling Argentina to bring its
extraterritorial, and immune, assets into the United States to pay its

258. See discussion supra Section III.A.
259. See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
260. Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978).
261. Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998) (internal citations
omitted; emphasis in original).
262. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609–10.
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creditors.263 In the end, this is exactly what Argentina did by settling with
its creditors.264Another example is the popularity of “judgment arbitrage,” in
which multinational creditors bring a foreign judgment to be domesticated
in the U.S., to rely on the broad reach of Equity Extraterritoriality in the postjudgment context.265 At least two New York courts have held that there is
no jurisdictional requirement for an action to obtain recognition of a foreign
judgment.266 This means that a judgment creditor may bring a money
judgment from any foreign court and convert it into a New York judgment.
With the newly minted New York judgment, the creditor may engage in the
far-reaching extraterritorial asset discovery and obtain asset turnover orders
against anyone over whom the New York court is willing to assert personal
jurisdiction (most likely a third party intermediary, like a bank in New
York).267 One may address this issue by introducing jurisdictional or other
requirements for giving recognition to foreign judgments.268 But the more
fundamental cause of this issue is the reason why foreign creditors come to
New York courts in the first place—the ability to reach any part of the world
through the Equity Extraterritoriality orders that New York courts may make
in the course of judgment enforcement.269
These inconsistencies in the application of territoriality undermine the
confidence in the rule of law. Many commentators who observed the
inconsistent application of territoriality offer a cynical explanation.
Professor Jonathan Turley, for example, argued that the U.S. territoriality
doctrine has been applied selectively, allowing “market” cases like ones
263. See Cross, supra note 124, at 137–38.
264. See Vinod Sreeharsha, Argentina’s Senate Votes to Allow Payment to U.S. Bondholders, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2016 at B2.
265. See Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition and the
Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 459, 460 (2013).
See also Marcus S. Quintanilla and Christopher A. Whytock, New Multipolarity in Transnational
Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 35–37 (2011)
(projecting a significant increase in foreign judgment creditors attempting to obtain recognition of
judgment from U.S. courts).
266. See Abu Dhabi Comm. Bank PJSC v. Saad Trading, Contracting and Fin. Svcs. Co., 986 N.Y.S.
2d 454, 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2014); Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec. Inc., 723 N.Y.S. 2d 285, 292
(N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2001).
267. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5201 (2015) (providing for third party garnishment); id. § 5223 (providing
for post-judgment asset discovery); id. § 5225 (providing for delivery of debtor property).
268. For discussion on adding requirements for foreign judgment recognition to prevent abuse, see
Linda J. Silberman and Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and
Awards: What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 344, 359 (2016).
269. See id. at 385 (“creditors enforcing judgments or awards in the United States typically seek two
particular remedies—discovery of the debtor’s assets within and without the state and turnover of the
debtor’s assets held by third parties. These remedies are powerful tools and class in personam remedies
that may extend beyond the territorial borders of the United States.”).
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involving the Sherman Act to apply extraterritorially while “nonmarket”
cases faced the presumption against extraterritoriality.270Similarly, Professor
Mark Gibney argued that “U.S. law has been applied extraterritorially when
that has served the national interest of the United States or its corporate
actors, and it has been given a territorial application when a restrictive
interpretation would serve those same ends.”271 This perception of
situational application of the law will continue until territoriality principles
apply to the operation of Equity Extraterritoriality in a meaningful way.
3. Fostering Inconsistency Within Jurisdictional Territoriality
The problem of inconsistency caused by Equity Extraterritoriality does
not merely plague the application of the territoriality doctrine as a whole.
The very availability of Equity Extraterritoriality fosters inconsistency
within jurisdictional territoriality, or on how territoriality principles apply to
personal jurisdiction.
As noted earlier, U.S. courts often raise the threat of force against
extraterritorial persons or property by using extraterritorial jurisdiction and
Equity Extraterritoriality together. Earlier, we used the example of
extraterritorial document discovery to see Equity Extraterritoriality induces
compliance with the U.S. laws from persons located outside of the territorial
boundaries of the United States long before the court establishes jurisdiction
over them.272 The threat of force, in that instance, is the threat of U.S. court
finding jurisdiction over a person located beyond its territorial jurisdiction,
and issuing extraterritorial orders pertaining to properties (i.e. documents)
located beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
The unpredictability of jurisdictional extraterritoriality does much to
fuel the strength of Equity Extraterritoriality. While it is true that the
Supreme Court in recent years greatly strengthened the territorial limitations
on jurisdiction, a number of legal theories are still available for a U.S. court
that wishes to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s
endorsement of “tag” jurisdiction in Burnham—denounced as “closer . . . to
robbery than justice”273—remains good law.274 The same is true for general
270. See Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 608 (1990).
271. Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of Democratic
Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of Establishing Normative Principles,
19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 304–05 (1996).
272. See discussion supra Section II.A.
273. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: the “Power” Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 290 (1956).
274. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 251 (2d Cir. 1995) (asserting personal jurisdiction
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jurisdiction over foreign corporations “doing business” in the United States
through affiliates, although Daimler did significantly reduce its
application.275 The interaction between Equity Extraterritoriality and the
“effects” test deserves emphasis. Numerous commentators have criticized
the “effects” test, the “Great Grimpen Mire”276 of a legal doctrine that the
courts have applied “[w]ith almost haphazard nonchalance.”277 Yet the farreaching “effects” test, a holdover doctrine from the mid-20th century
personal jurisdiction revolution, remains a favorite among courts that seek
to extend their jurisdiction beyond their territorial boundaries.278 This, in
turn, extends the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality.
However, it is important to note that the reverse is also true. It is not
merely that jurisdictional extraterritoriality strengthens Equity
Extraterritoriality; the availability of unchecked Equity Extraterritoriality
causes further extension of jurisdictional extraterritoriality. Because there is
no territorial restriction on the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality after the
court obtains personal jurisdiction, the parties are incentivized to push the
court to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction as much as possible, in order to
access the extraterritorial orders that become available once jurisdiction is
established. The parties, then, naturally focus on the weakness within the
territoriality principles in the personal jurisdiction doctrine, namely the
inconsistency between the presumption against extraterritoriality and the
various theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction, including the “minimum
contacts”/“effects” test. Often, this endeavor results in a situation where the
tail wags the dog: because Equity Extraterritoriality seems necessary, the
court summons the “effects” test as a post hoc justification for its power.
This is evident in In re Rimsat, Ltd., in which Judge Posner found that the
automatic stay provision in the Bankruptcy Code applied to extraterritorial
over individual who was served within the forum); Doe I v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1275 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (same).
275. See post-Daimler cases such as: Hume v. Farr’s Coach Lines, Ltd., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
133000 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (ordering further jurisdictional discovery over a Canadian corporation
to assess the potential basis of “doing business” general jurisdiction); Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Hospira,
Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45826 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2016) (finding continued validity of “doing business”
general jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation that appointed an agent for service of process in the
forum state).
276. Joseph E. Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust Violations—Paths Through
the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 519 (1971).
277. GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 658–59 (4th ed. 2007). See also Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application
of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 179–80 (1991); Gibney, supra note 271, at 302; Parrish, supra
note 123, at 1480.
278. See Parrish, supra note 123, at 1457 (“At the heart of most extraterritoriality cases lies the
effects test.”).
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assets because “[t]he efficacy of the bankruptcy proceeding depends on the
court’s ability to control and marshal the assets of the debtor wherever
located,”279 without making any further attempt to square the need of the
bankruptcy court with the presumption against extraterritorial interpretation
of the Bankruptcy Code.
This problem is particularly visible when the court compounds Equity
Extraterritoriality by issuing an order against an extraterritorial third party
who violated the court’s (separate) extraterritorial order. In Waffenschmidt
v. Mackay, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that nonparties residing
outside the territorial jurisdiction of a district court were subject to that
court’s contempt jurisdiction if they knowingly aided and abetted a party
violating the court’s order, even if such nonparties had no other contact with
the forum.280 The court found that the nonparty’s interference with the
court’s order alone constituted sufficient minimum contact, because such
interference caused a substantial effect in the forum.281 The Seventh Circuit
reached a similar conclusion in S.E.C. v. Homa, also based on the “effects”
test.282 In no other context would the court leverage such a tenuous
connection to the forum to assert extraterritorial personal jurisdiction. Under
ordinary circumstances, it is a settled rule that the court cannot assert specific
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant whose only contact with the
forum is through the plaintiff.283 But in Waffenschmidt and Homa, two
Circuit Courts have declared that they have personal jurisdiction over an
extraterritorial third party whose only contact with the forum is through the
court’s extraterritorial order, based on the “effects” test. Under this
formulation, there is simply no corner in the world that the court cannot
reach: the court may first establish extraterritorial jurisdiction by way of any
one of the long-arm jurisdiction theories, then issue extraterritorial orders
pursuant to Equity Extraterritoriality, and then assert jurisdiction over any
extraterritorial third party that may interfere with the enforcement of that
279. 98 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 1996).
280. 763 F.2d 711, 721 (5th Cir. 1985).
281. See id. at 722–23.
282. 514 F.3d 661, 673–75 (7th Cir. 2008); see also ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bowers, 651 F.3d
1200, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming that a “district court may properly exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonparty for purposes of entering contempt orders, when the nonparty, with actual
notice of an injunctive order issued by the district court, and in active concert or participation with a party,
violates that order”); but see Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122, 137 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting
that in Waffenschmidt, the nonparties at issue were out of the court’s territorial jurisdiction but still within
the United States, and that in Homa, although the nonparties were outside of the United States, they were
U.S. citizens).
283. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298–99 (1980); McIntyre
Mach. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886–87 (2011).
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extraterritorial order. Indeed, this is essentially what happened to the third
party European banks in the Argentina bond litigation.284
The existence of Equity Extraterritoriality itself appears to motivate this
jaw-dropping declaration that there is no corner of the world that the court
cannot reach. The court must be able to enforce its own order; if the order
happens to be extraterritorial, how else is the court supposed to enforce its
order other than by exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the person
outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction? Yet such an exercise of
jurisdiction is plainly inconsistent with other territorial limitations upon
personal jurisdiction, such as presumption against extraterritoriality. The
availability of Equity Extraterritoriality motivates the courts to perpetuate
such inconsistency, rather than to streamline the personal jurisdiction
doctrine along the lines of territoriality principles.
4. Transnationality Blindness
Yet another critical area of underdevelopment in Equity
Extraterritoriality is what may be termed “transnationality blindness”—the
lack of distinction between domestic and international litigation. This, in
fact, is a cognitive challenge from which the entire U.S. transnational
litigation jurisprudence suffers. Facing transnational litigation, U.S. courts
generally equate foreign nations with one of the U.S. states, with little to no
separate consideration for foreign policy implications that may arise with the
foreign nations.285 Although eminent commentators have long criticized this
peculiar tendency,286 transnationality blindness continues to affect all stages
of litigation in the United States, including jurisdiction,287 provisional

284. See discussion supra Section IV.A.2.
285. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Practice and Procedure: the World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1456, 1458–59 (1991) (raising doubt as to whether transnational litigation may be considered a
separate field within the U.S. law); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation:
A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 431–433 (2001) (noting that
transnational intellectual property disputes are treated in the same manner as domestic disputes).
286. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 167
(Feb. 5) (Jessup, J.) (stating that jurisdictional rules which are “valid enough for inter-state conflicts
within the constitutional system of the United States, may be improper when placing a burden on
international commerce”).
287. See Donald E. Childress III, Rethinking Globalization: the Case of Transnational Personal
Jurisdiction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1548 (2013) (proposing a new rule on personal jurisdiction
specifically for nonresident alien defendants).
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orders,288 and judgment recognition.289 This lacuna is evident from the
history of Equity Extraterritoriality as well, as courts weighing in on Equity
Extraterritoriality cases have rarely paused to give an extra layer of
consideration for international cases.290
Equity Extraterritoriality may arise in two ways, domestic and
international: a court of one state may issue an extraterritorial order binding
persons and conducts in another state, or; a U.S. court may issue an
extraterritorial order binding persons and conducts in another country.291
U.S. jurisprudence views both instances as qualitatively the same. While
such a view may be defensible in theory, as a practical matter, an intrafederation dispute and an inter-national dispute plainly have very different
implications. Ignoring such implications “elevates domestic interests over
international considerations.”292 That is to say: transnationality blindness
results in an anomalous situation in which a domestic party receives more
procedural safeguards than a foreign party, although the latter would have
the greater need for those safeguards.
Domestic Equity Extraterritoriality has a number of legal and practical
safeguards to prevent the most outrageous forms of the court’s
extraterritorial excursions. Chief among the safeguards is the Constitution
of the United States, which serves as a device for harmonizing multiple
claims of sovereignty made by the various states.293 The states send their
representatives to the federal legislature, which passes statutes of general
288. See George A. Bermann, Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 553, 560 (1997) (noting U.S. courts’ indifference toward parties’ nationalities in granting
provisional relief); S. Nathan Park, Recognition of Enforcement of Foreign Provisional Orders in the
United States: Toward a Practical Solution, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 999, 1034 (2017) (noting the
discrepancy posed by U.S. courts’ indifference toward parties’ nationalities in granting provisional relief).
289. See Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negotiating a Worldwide
Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: Some Initial Lessons, in A
GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 263, 264 (John J. Barcelo
III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002) (“In general, American courts have not subjected judgments of the
courts of other nations to a separate test to determine whether they are entitled to recognition and
enforcement.”).
290. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 159, at 1334 (criticizing Grupo Mexicano for failing to “take
account of special needs and concerns when foreign parties are involved”); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102 cmt. g. (AM. LAW. INST. 1971) (calling for recognition of foreign
injunctive orders because “American courts . . . have usually given the same measure of respect to
judgments rendered in foreign nations . . . that they give to judgments rendered in sister States”).
291. See discussion supra Section II.B.
292. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57
AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 649 (2009).
293. See, e.g., Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 80 (noting that the Commerce Clause, Full Faith and
Credit Clause, and the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution necessarily limits a state court’s
extraterritorial reach).
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applicability.294 When there is a dispute as to the applicability of the federal
statutes, the states and their residents ultimately submit to the jurisdiction of
the U.S. Supreme Court,295 the highest court of the land that conclusively
resolves the dispute by referring to an established and shared legal tradition.
The various states of the United States have centuries of common history,
language and culture, such that the real-life impact of an extraterritorial court
order is minimized as a practical matter. Taken together, this means that
more often than not, domestic Equity Extraterritoriality disputes are
essentially disputes concerning the determination of the proper venue rather
than a true clash of sovereign authorities.
Same cannot be said for Equity Extraterritoriality in the context of
transnational litigation. There is no superstructure that governs the many
nations of the world in a manner similar as the federal government governs
the states within the United States. For example, the U.S. Congress
attempted to address the Equity Extraterritoriality issue in 1927 by proposing
a bill that would have required state and federal courts to accord full faith
and credit to all injunctive and other equitable decrees.296 The failure of the
bill—the first and only attempt to resolve the problem of Equity
Extraterritoriality by federal legislation—serves as a sad testament for the
severe underdevelopment of the doctrine, even in the domestic context.297
But in the international context that lacks the overarching legislature that is
analogous to the Congress of the United States, this type of legislative
harmonization is completely unavailable, leading to the free-for-all battles
that international Equity Extraterritoriality often generates. The states within
the United States, for instance, generally would not pass blocking statutes to
protest another state’s exercise of sovereignty beyond its territorial borders,
unlike the numerous national governments that passed blocking statutes in
order to protest the application of U.S. laws. In the domestic context, the
federal government generally would have headed off the dispute before it
reached the stage at which sister states each passed a law to block the laws

294. See U.S. CONST. ART. I.
295. See U.S. CONST. ART. III; see also Messner, supra note 77, at 526 (noting that the Constitution’s
Full Faith and Credit clause would govern Equity Extraterritoriality, requiring sister state courts to
recognize the force of other state courts’ extraterritorial injunctions).
296. See Report of the Standing Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, 50 ANNU. REP. ABA.
292, 319 (1927).
297. See also Price, supra note 24, at 760 (“Only a few courts have held unequivocally that full faith
and credit must be accorded permanent injunctions of sister states. Even in these instances, however, it
is unclear whether the underlying theory is more akin to recognition of the res judicata effect of the prior
proceeding, or that the injunction is directly enforceable in the second state.”).
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of other states.298 This lack of superstructure in the international arena brings
about an upside-down world in transnational litigation: although a foreign
party requires greater procedural safeguards to prevent being haled into an
unfamiliar court and become subject to an extraterritorial order that may
create conflicting legal obligations, Equity Extraterritoriality doctrine gives
less protection to the foreign party compared to the domestic party in the
same situation.
V. SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF EQUITY
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The problem of Equity Extraterritoriality is a problem of
extraterritoriality and underdevelopment, which is bound to become worse
as the needs of modern commerce place increasingly greater pressure on the
underdeveloped doctrine. What can be done to address this problem? The
nature of Equity Extraterritoriality would require a two-track approach: one
for interstate/domestic instances of Equity Extraterritoriality, and another for
international. Domestic Equity Extraterritoriality is the easier to fix, as there
are constitutional principles that may be utilized to harmonize the territorial
sovereignty of various states. Reining in the excess of international Equity
Extraterritoriality, on the other hand, would require a new framework. In
this section, I propose a sovereignty-allocating legal test that harkens back
to the origin of the territoriality principles, by forging a practical application
of the principle of international comity. My proposed solution injects the
comity concern into the framework of conflict of laws, resulting in a more
muscular test that demands the court to give due consideration for the
interests of the foreign sovereign.
A. Devising a Solution for Equity Extraterritoriality
The mechanism of Equity Extraterritoriality relies on two links of
control: a court relies on the unpredictable personal jurisdiction doctrine to
control the person with extraterritorial capacity (such as a multinational
corporation) and then orders the person to take actions beyond the court’s
territorial jurisdiction. The solution, then, must be twofold as well: on the
front end of litigation, install a more consistent standard for establishing
extraterritorial jurisdiction to guard against the erratic exercise of long-arm
jurisdiction and, on the back end of litigation, place additional safeguards
against extraterritorial orders based on territoriality principles.

298. Cf. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996) (federal statute allowing each state
to refuse to give recognition to same-sex marriage consummated in a sister state).
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to address in depth the first part of
the solution, involving personal jurisdiction. Much ink has been spilled
about creating a more definite and consistent limit on the court’s assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.299 To that end, the U.S. courts’ recent trend of
avoiding transnational litigation is encouraging.300 In addition to the recent
Supreme Court cases discussed earlier,301 the court’s opinion in Sinochem
International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp. does much to
assist the lower courts navigating the personal jurisdiction issue in
transnational cases.302 In Sinochem, the court found that forum non
conveniens dismissal was available at any stage of the litigation, even before
the court establishes personal and subject matter jurisdiction.303Although this
trend of “litigation isolationism” is not without its problems,304 such
retrenchment would at least partially address the problems of Equity
Extraterritoriality by cutting back on the U.S. judiciary’s interaction with the
international arena, which would then reduce the necessity for the U.S. courts
to issue extraterritorial orders.
But streamlining the personal jurisdiction doctrine alone is insufficient
to address the full extent of the problems posed by Equity Extraterritoriality.
There are plenty of situations in which the court’s claim of personal
jurisdiction is unassailable, but the court’s extraterritorial order causes a
problem regardless. In the Argentina bond case, for example, the Republic
of Argentina partially waived its sovereign immunity by voluntarily
submitting itself to the U.S. court’s jurisdiction in relation to its bonds.305
Thus, the New York federal court’s jurisdiction over Argentina was never in
question. But Argentina retained other types of sovereign immunity,
including immunity against execution of the assets that it owned.306 It is this
execution immunity of Argentina—which Argentina never relinquished—
that the New York federal court overrode by resorting to Equity
Extraterritoriality, i.e. by prohibiting Argentina from paying the creditors
299. For a well-considered discussion on finding consistency in the doctrine of personal jurisdiction,
see, e.g., Silberman & Simowitz, supra note 268, at 393–95; Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer was Right:
Jurisdiction and General Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1315–16 (2017).
300. See Bookman, supra note 127, at 1119.
301. See discussion supra Section III.C.1.
302. See 549 U.S. 422, 432–35 (2007).
303. See id. at 432 (“A district court therefore may dispose of an action by a forum non conveniens
dismissal, bypassing questions of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, when considerations of
convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so warrant.”).
304. See Bookman, supra note 127, at 1136 (noting the possibility that “litigation isolationism” may
lead to a compromise in U.S. sovereign interest of hearing Americans’ disputes in American courts).
305. See NML Capital v. Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 263 (2d Cir. 2013).
306. See 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (2012).
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that held new exchanged bonds, regardless of where the payment might
occur, unless it also paid the holders of the old non-exchanged bonds that
Argentina tried to restructure.307 In this instance, the problem of Equity
Extraterritoriality arises independently from the problem of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. For an alternative example, recall the augmented-reality
smartphone game developed by a U.S. videogame company that records
physical movements of an Australian gamer.308 A court of the United States
would have a perfectly valid claim of jurisdiction over the U.S. videogame
company. Yet the court may order the U.S. company to produce the location
data of an Australian citizen and resident—at which point the Australian
sovereign may have a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of its
subjects. Here again, the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the
problem of Equity Extraterritoriality are not coterminous. Further, as
discussed above, the very availability of Equity Extraterritoriality hinders the
streamlining of personal jurisdiction doctrine, as parties are incentivized to
push the court to exercise expansive jurisdiction so that they may obtain an
extraterritorial Equity order.309
Equity Extraterritoriality, therefore, must be addressed on its own
terms, rather than as a side effect of jurisdictional extraterritoriality. The
problem of extraterritoriality may arise on the front end of the litigation, as
well as on the back end. Finding the legal principles that may serve as
safeguards against the abuse of extraterritoriality on the back end of the
litigation—the portion governed by Equity Extraterritoriality—is the more
urgent part of the problem, precisely because so little attention is paid to it.
As noted earlier, the problem of Equity Extraterritoriality may arise in
two contexts: interstate/domestic and international. The instances of
domestic and international Equity Extraterritoriality require two different
responses, because the environments in which these two arise are markedly
different.
1. Domestic Equity Extraterritoriality
“Domestic” Equity Extraterritoriality, i.e. extraterritorial court orders
whose ordered activities occur within the United States, is the easier problem
to address. The stakes are lower for the problem of domestic Equity
Extraterritoriality, as it is nearly interchangeable with the question of proper
venue within the United States to issue the court order. Further, the legal
307. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 254–55; see also Cross, supra note 124, at 111; Pomager, supra
note 124, at 349–50.
308. See discussion supra Section IV.A.2.
309. See discussion supra Section IV.C.3.
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principles that may serve as limiting principles already exist. The problem
is not so much a lack of structure but a lack of development. The
foundational principles to harmonize the various states’ territorial
sovereignty are already in place in the form of the U.S. Constitution, and the
institutional infrastructure to implement the principles are also in place in the
form of the U.S. Supreme Court. Stated differently, the problem of domestic
Equity Extraterritoriality is a problem of neglect, of the kind that the
Supreme Court would be able to address with a few opinions.310
Accordingly, I present here only a brief overview of the proposed solution.
At least five constitutional principles are available to limit the reach of
state courts (which include federal courts applying state law) beyond the
state boundary lines: separation of powers, federalism, Commerce Clause,
Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. Evaluating Equity
Extraterritoriality in light of these five constitutional principles makes visible
the limits of extraterritorial power that a state court sitting in equity may
wield. That is to say, the necessary consequence of these principles is that
there is a constitutional limit as to a state court’s exercise of extraterritorial
powers.
Separation of powers and federalism set the outer edges of domestic
Equity Extraterritoriality by limiting a state court’s extraterritorial authority
to the territorial boundaries of the United States, because the state court’s
Equity Extraterritoriality beyond the U.S. borders impermissibly infringes
upon the power to conduct foreign policy given exclusively to the political
branches of the federal government.311 The Commerce Clause, Full Faith
and Credit Clause and Tenth Amendment define the extent to which a state
court may reach beyond its territorial jurisdiction within the United States.312
The Tenth Amendment, on its face, guarantees the sovereignty of the various
states.313 Such sovereignty is to be harmonized through the workings of the
federal government, including the U.S. Supreme Court.314 Commerce
Clause protects the federation from internally inconsistent economic
regulations that may be caused by each state’s extraterritorial overreach.315
310. Legislative intervention, of course, is also an option. In the context of intellectual property, for
example, the relevant statutes provide for nationwide injunctive power from a federal district court. See,
e.g., Trademark Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012).
311. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10; id. art. II, § 2.
312. See Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 80.
313. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
314. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropo. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (rejecting the
claim based on the Tenth Amendment that a state agency is immune from federal law).
315. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989) (“our established view [is] that a state
law that has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside of the State’s borders
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The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the states to “respect the legitimate
interest of other States and avoid infringement upon their sovereignty”316 by
setting the standard as to which state court orders deserve recognition and
which do not.
Of course, these five principles do not give the precise line of limitation
upon a state court’s claim of Equity Extraterritoriality. But collectively,
these constitutional doctrines give the general contours of the principles that
may serve to limit the excess of domestic Equity Extraterritoriality. Further,
the Supreme Court has implied in several opinions that no single
constitutional provision contains the territoriality principle for the states.317
Given the foregoing, it is a relatively easy task for the Supreme Court to
locate some type of constitutional limitation on domestic Equity
Extraterritoriality.
2. International Equity Extraterritoriality
International Equity Extraterritoriality is a different matter. None of the
superstructures imposed on top of the various states within the United States
exist above the various nations of the world. Also, the stakes are higher. As
a practical matter, domestic Equity Extraterritoriality does not amount to
much more than a battle to determine a proper venue that may issue the court
order. If domestic Equity Extraterritoriality heats up beyond the venue fight,
one can expect that national legislation would be introduced to address the
issue.318 That is not so in the case of international Equity Extraterritoriality:
when courts of two national sovereigns collide, the result is almost always a
free-for-all in which one national court pressures the other to capitulate.319
This is the result to be avoided. One obvious step to take is to drop the
transnationality blindness and insist that U.S. courts apply a different rule
when a case involves a foreign element. This much is possible by applying

is invalid under the Commerce Clause.”); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (striking down
Illinois state law that regulates transactions that take place across state lines); Japan Line Ltd. v. County
of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (striking down local taxes on shipping containers because
foreign commerce is “preeminently a matter of national concern.”).
316. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322 (1981) (Stevens, J. concurring).
317. See Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 80–81 (noting that several Supreme Court opinions, such as
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 546 (1973) and Edgar, 457 U.S. at 624, did not cite the Constitution
to apply territorial limitations upon state intellectual property regulations).
318. See Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 58 (“Just as the sovereign interest of the states vis-à-vis the
federal government may be protected by their representation in the federal government, the sovereign
interests of states vis-à-vis each other may be protected by their ability to protect those interests through
national legislation.”).
319. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 932–36 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
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the existing constitutional doctrine on federalism and separation of
powers.320 Beyond that, however, there is no off-the-shelf legal principle
with which to limit the reach of international Equity Extraterritoriality.
The history of Equity Extraterritoriality may offer some guidance in
identifying a limiting principle that may be of service, because Equity
Extraterritoriality has not always been as unbridled as it is today. Looking
back on Equity Extraterritoriality’s history, three moments that restricted the
reach of Equity Extraterritoriality stand out. In Amey, Judge Hand limited
the application of Equity Extraterritoriality to enforcement of concrete and
previously existing personal obligation.321 In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court
limited the application of Equity Extraterritoriality to those persons found
and served within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.322 And in 17th century
England, the equity court dispensed Equity Extraterritoriality selectively as
exceptions to the general rule of territoriality to which the common law
courts adhered.323 All three moments offer examples of the limits that may
be placed on Equity Extraterritoriality. But it is far too late in the day to
actually implement any one of these three types of limitations. The Amey
limitation would mean turning back the clock on the modern regulatory state,
as it excludes Equity Extraterritoriality from being applied to enforce a
general, statutory obligation instead of a previously existing personal
obligation. Enforcing the Pennoyer-style strict territoriality in jurisdiction is
not feasible in a world in which many nations are moving toward effectsbased jurisdiction,324 and at any rate, it ultimately commits the same error
that today’s Equity Extraterritoriality doctrine does—namely, depending
entirely on the front end of the litigation to regulate the extraterritorial
excursions occurring at the back end of the litigation. Finally, reverting U.S.
law to the times prior to the merger of law and equity simply to address the
extraterritoriality problem is out of the question, despite the inchoate efforts
by Justice Scalia in Grupo Mexicano v. All. Bond Fund, Inc.325
If we cannot turn back time, what remains to be learned from history?
Although history may not offer an off-the-shelf solution, we may yet find in
history the principle needed to build an appropriate new legal test. The

320. See discussion supra Section IV.C.4.
321. See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
322. See discussion supra Section III.A.
323. See discussion supra Sections III.A. and III.B.2.a.
324. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 16 (Judgment of Sept. 7);
Raustiala, supra note 2, at 125.
325. 527 U.S. 308, 318–19 (1999).
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original source of the territoriality principles supplies just such a principle:
international comity.
a. International Comity as the Animating Principle
“Comity?!”, cried the reader of this long article thus far. For those
trained in the U.S. legal tradition, the comity doctrine may be an uninspiring,
weak tea of a doctrine. Such reaction usually stems from the doctrine’s
vagueness and uncertainty. Hilton v. Guyot, the most cited U.S. Supreme
Court precedent for comity, gives this ambivalent description of the concept:
“comity is, and ever must be, uncertain; that it must necessarily depend on a
variety of circumstances which cannot be reduced to any certain rule.”326
Courts and legal academics have waged a sustained series of attacks against
this ambiguous character of comity. Judge Benjamin Cardozo said “comity”
suggested “a discretion unregulated by general principles.”327 Professor
Harold Maier called comity “an amorphous never-never land whose borders
are marked by fuzzy lines of politics, courtesy and good faith.”328 Professor
Paul Stephan similarly said: “Vague terms, such as ‘comity’ promise much
and deliver little in terms of usable instructions for judges facing a potential
encounter with foreign courts.”329 Calling for the comity doctrine to be
abandoned, Professor Joel Paul gave a litany of different definitions that
“comity” has had:
Comity has been defined variously as the basis of international law, a rule
of international law, a synonym for private international law, a rule of
choice of law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between
sovereigns, a moral necessity, expediency, reciprocity, or “considerations
of high international politics concerned with maintaining amicable and
workable relationships between nations.”330

This confused state of the law led to an inconsistent application of the comity
doctrine. For example, in a pair of cases decided in 1997, the Peruvian
government fell on both sides of the comity doctrine. In Pravin Banker
Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, the Second Circuit found that
Peruvian government’s request for a moratorium on the payment of certain
bank debts (which Peru guaranteed) did not warrant an application of
326. 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
(providing examples of eight factors while calling the court to
“evaluat[e] all relevant factors” when considering whether to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction).
327. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201–2 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1918) (citing Joseph Beale,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71).
328. Harold Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at Crossroads: The Intersection Between Public
and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281 (1982).
329. Stephan, supra note 207, at 205.
330. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3–4 (1991).

OF THE U.S. § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1987)
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comity.331 Only eight weeks later in Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Co.,
the Fifth Circuit held that comity required accepting Peru’s request that the
U.S. litigation be stopped so that the Peruvian government might regulate its
own matters, in this case involving industrial pollution.332
Given this confusion, criticisms of comity as the current U.S. legal
doctrine are well-placed. But the criticisms are off the mark if they are
directed to the original conception of comity from the times of the Peace of
Westphalia. Ulrich Huber’s writing, for example, makes clear that Huber—
the source of the territoriality doctrine in Pennoyer—conceived comity as a
mandatory obligation. 333 To Huber, comity was not discretionary, unlike the
comity doctrine in U.S. law today. Huber intended comity to be a part of the
universal international law, on par with the principles of territorial
sovereignty.334
Early Supreme Court decisions on territoriality lend support to Huber’s
more muscular type of comity. In The Schooner “Exchange” v. M’Faddon,
the Supreme Court’s first pronouncement of the territoriality principle
simultaneously held that a sovereign’s law is supreme within its territory and
the interest of the foreign sovereign must be respected, even if the foreign
sovereign’s interest is in the form of a warship located within the United
States.335 Although M’Faddon did not use the word “comity” to support its
holding, Justice Story would write just a decade later in The Santissima
Trinidad that the M’Faddon decision “stands upon principles of public
comity and convenience.”336 Hilton did much to weaken the application of
comity by holding that “comity is, and ever must be, uncertain.”337 Yet the
idea that comity is the principle that mediates the clash between sovereigns
has survived the damage that Hilton wrought. Comity’s staying power is
particularly visible in the Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence, which is seen
as implementing the rules of comity to regulate the sovereign interests of the

331. 109 F.3d at 850, 852–54 (2d Cir. 1997).
332. 113 F.3d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 1997).
333. See Mills, supra note 65, at 26; ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS:
A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 8–9 (1992).
334. Although beyond the scope of this paper, the history of comity doctrine in U.S. law and the
process through which Huber’s conception of mandatory comity turned into a discretionary one is highly
interesting. For a compelling account, see Watson, supra note 333, at 27–44.
335. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–46 (1812); see also Theodore D. Woolsey, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1895) (“Comity is another duty of nations. . . . the term seems to
embrace not only that kindness which emanates from friendly feeling, but also tokens of respect which
are due between nations on the ground of right.”).
336. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822).
337. 159 U.S. at 164.
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various states.338 The principle of comity also remains alive in the
international context, as many of the landmark Supreme Court cases reining
in the lower court’s assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond U.S.
borders have cited comity as the basis for giving respect to foreign
sovereigns.339 What is more, even in the cases that allowed the U.S. court to
venture beyond the national borders, the Supreme Court usually felt the need
to give some considerations for the principle of international comity.340
Comity has much to offer if we consider it a higher-order principle that
is on par with the principle of sovereign territoriality. Ulrich Huber, whose
territoriality principles form the basis of the U.S. territoriality doctrine,
considered comity to be obligatory. Although it is true that the current U.S.
doctrine on comity is vague and uncertain, comity may be re-imagined as the
governing principle that animates the legal test that resolves the competing
interests of various sovereigns in the context of Equity Extraterritoriality.
b. Proposed Approach: Comity-Fueled Conflict of Laws Test
My reliance on Huber’s theory of comity is not to say that Huber had
worked out all the details on how the comity principle would operate as a
legal test—after all, Huber’s principles were closer to being political theories
rather than a workable legal doctrine.341 What would the comity-fueled legal
338. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1309 (1833) (The Full Faith and Credit Clause “import[s] no more than that the same faith and credit are
to be given to [state court judgments], which, by comity of nations, is ordinarily conceded to all foreign
judgments[.]”); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2003) (discussing the implication of
comity within the context of Full Faith and Credit Clause). See also Kelly Stoner and Richard A. Orona,
Full Faith and Credit, Comity, or Federal Mandate? A Path that Leads to Recognition and Enforcement
of Tribal Court Orders, Tribal Protection Orders, and Tribal Child Custody Orders, 34 N.M. L. REV.
381, 382 (2004) (discussing interaction between Full Faith and Credit Clause and the comity doctrine
with respect to recognition of Native American tribal court orders).
339. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“For another
jurisdiction . . . to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the
acts . . . would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations . . . .”); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 128 (2013) (Kennedy, J. concurring)
(“Adjudicating any such claim must . . . also be consistent with those notions of comity that lead each
nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations . . . .”); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746,
763 (2015) (“The Ninth Circuit, moreover paid little heed to the risks to international comity its expansive
view of general jurisdiction posed.”). See also Breyer, supra note 21, at 92 (“In applying [comity], our
Court has increasingly sought interpretations of domestic law that would allow it to work in harmony
with related foreign laws, so that together they can more effectively achieve common objectives.”).
340. See, e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. D. for the S.D. Cal., 482 U.S. 522,
537 n. 23 (1987) (“Both comity and concern for the separation of powers counsel the utmost restraint in
attributing motives to sovereign states which have bargained as equals.”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal.,
509 U.S. 764, 770 (1993) (“[T]he principle of international comity does not preclude District Court
jurisdiction over the foreign conduct alleged.”).
341. See Hazard, supra note 66, at 260. To the extent that Huber developed a legal test based on
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test that governs Equity Extraterritoriality look like? I submit that it would
look fairly similar, but not identical, to conflict of laws.342 Comity’s chief
concern is to harmonize the competing interests of the sovereigns. Brainerd
Currie noted that conflict of laws jurisprudence has the same concern: “The
central problem of conflict of laws may be defined, then, as that of
determining the appropriate rule of decision when the interests of two or
more states are in conflict—in other words, of determining which interest
shall yield.”343 Professor Donald Childress noticed this parallel between
comity and conflict of laws, and argued that international comity may be resituated as conflict of laws.344 I broadly agree with Childress’s observation,
and believe that conflict of laws jurisprudence may inform the way in which
Equity Extraterritoriality may be restrained.
However, a caveat is necessary: Equity Extraterritoriality is not entirely
a question of conflict of laws, whose operation usually involves choosing the
law to be applied to determine a given controversy.345 Despite Currie’s
observation that the chief concern of conflict of laws is the mediation of
competing sovereign interests, the conflict of laws test that actually operates
within the U.S. jurisprudence usually involves mediation of competing laws,
which is not entirely synonymous with mediation of the competing sovereign
interests.346 “Foreign sovereign interest” is a higher-order concept than
“foreign law”; a foreign sovereign’s interest covers a greater range than what
is expressed in its laws. Thus, the test to regulate Equity Extraterritoriality
may be characterized as “conflict of sovereign interests” test, analogous to

comity, such a test was for situations in which courts of one country had to apply the laws of another
country, and not necessarily for balancing sovereign interests. See generally Paul, supra note 330, at 15–
17.
342. See William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079
(2015) (classifying conflict of laws as one of the expressions of the comity principle).
343. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS 178 (1963). See also
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 168 (2001) (“Interest analysis is,
after all, an attempt to derive solution to conflicts problems from the notion of sovereignty.”); Dodge,
supra note 342, at 2073 (“Comity has long served as the basis for the conflict of laws . . . .”).
344. See Donald E. Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict
of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 62–78 (2010).
345. See Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 17.
346. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (“The only substantial
question in this litigation is whether there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law.”)
(internal quotation omitted); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17135, at *23 (“To
determine . . . whether a ‘true conflict’ exists, we must determine conclusively what the law of each
country requires.”) (emphasis added). See also Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 17 (noting that the problem
of extraterritorial injunctions is not reducible to conflict of laws, because “[t]he problem is not with the
application of the forum law to the problem in the first instance, but rather with granting an extraterritorial
remedy”).
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conflict of laws in structure but with the greater range of concern motivated
by comity.347 This is because the problem of Equity Extraterritoriality is not
merely an interference with a foreign law, but an interference with a foreign
sovereign interest. In other words, the test may be described as “comityfueled conflict of laws.”
Considering the points discussed above, I propose the following legal
test to restrain the excess of international Equity Extraterritoriality. I propose
that Equity Extraterritoriality analysis should resolve the competing
sovereign interests by way of shifting presumptions. So far, to the extent
that the courts have analyzed Equity Extraterritoriality at all, they did so
based on some type of balancing test. The Supreme Court in Aerospatiale,
for example, explicitly refused to provide any guidance as to how lower
courts might issue an extraterritorial discovery order.348 The lower courts,
grasping for straws, formulated a number of different balancing tests that
evaluated anywhere between three and seven factors.349 These balancing
tests mostly failed to give proper respect to the interests of foreign
sovereigns, resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of extraterritorial
discovery orders that explicitly mandated the party to break a foreign law.350
This was to be expected; indeed, the dissenting opinion in Aerospatiale
predicted this exact result, noting “courts are generally ill equipped to
assume the role of balancing the interests of foreign nations with that of our
own.”351

347. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that conflict of
laws test is the incorrect standard for applying international comity, because “the only issue of
international comity . . . is whether adjudication of this case by a United States court would [sic] amicable
working relationships” with a foreign state) (internal quotation omitted); Freund v. Republic of France,
592 F. Supp. 2d 540, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that Hartford Fire-style conflict analysis “is most
often applied when comity principles intersect with issues of statutory construction[,]” and comity
considerations operate beyond the “true conflict” analysis).
348. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. D. for S.D. Cal., 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987)
(“We do not articulate specific rules to guide this delicate task of adjudication.”); see also Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (proposing a seven-factor balancing test
for applying U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially).
349. See Sant, supra note 23, at 187.
350. See id. at 225–32. For criticisms of balancing tests applying territoriality principles, see Breyer,
supra note 21, at 100 (“[T]he [Timberlane balancing] test is complex, opening the door to broad judicial
discretion, and thus it creates unpredictability.”); Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American
Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT’L
L. 750, 754 (1995) (“Case-by-case balancing is a bad idea . . . . The considerations being weighed are
always imprecise enough to permit several answers and to dictate none.”); Meyer, supra note 222, at 160
(“[W]hen this balancing analysis is foisted upon judges, it undermines the appropriate role of courts as
neutral interpreters of the law.”).
351. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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If we are to stay true to Huber’s principle that comity is obligatory, a
more forceful approach is necessary. My proposal is a legal test of shifting
presumptions, which is often employed when vital interests such as civil
rights are at stake.352 The baseline presumption should remain the same as
it is today: the court may exercise its authority over persons under its
jurisdiction, including the authority to issue extraterritorial orders.353 This is
consistent with the territoriality principle that a sovereign may govern the
affairs occurring within its own territory.354 But the burden of proof would
shift if the person who would be so ordered makes a prima facie case that
the court’s exercise of Equity Extraterritoriality unduly contravenes an
important interest of a foreign sovereign. The party seeking the
extraterritorial order must then establish that the order does not unduly
contravene an important foreign sovereign interest.
The final result of this test would turn on two factors, which are to be
considered on a staggered scale: (1) the type and quality of foreign sovereign
interest involved, and; (2) the type and quality of the clash in sovereign
interests that the extraterritorial order would cause if granted.
The first factor would consider the type of foreign sovereign interest
involved on a cascading scale of importance. Topping the scale as the most
important would be when the foreign sovereign’s interest is implicated
directly,355 such as when the extraterritorial order directly binds the
sovereign356 or directly affects sovereign assets.357 Under such
circumstances, only a clear and unequivocal mandate from the political
branches would allow the court to rely on Equity Extraterritoriality to
infringe upon these interests. Next on the scale is the regulatory interest of
the foreign state that is expressed as a specific piece of law.358 Lower on the
352. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973) (announcing a test
of shifting presumption in applying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
353. See CURRIE, supra note 343, at 183 (“Normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the
court should be expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision found in the law of the
forum.”).
354. See discussion supra Section III.A.
355. See Dodge, supra note 342, at 2099 (noting that one of the types of comity is “sovereign party
comity,” i.e. deference to foreign governments as litigants).
356. See, e.g., Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Fed’n, 915 F. Supp. 2d 148,
154–55 (D. D.C. 2013); FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Republic of Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C.
Cir. 2011); BAE Sys. Tech. Solution & Servs. v. Republic of Korea’s Def. Acquisition Program Admin.,
195 F. Supp. 3d 776, 801–03 (D. Md. 2016).
357. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014).
358. See DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 100 (1965) (It is “reasonable to ascribe
to the state a desire to have the purposes its laws effectuated in situations where this would appear to
advance those purposes”). An intermediate position between the direct sovereign interest and regulatory
sovereign interest may be the sovereign interest in a state-owned enterprise, doing business in the
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scale is the position of the foreign sovereign on a discrete issue that is not
necessarily expressed as written law, but expressed clearly to the U.S.
judiciary through diplomatic communications or amicus curie briefs. Even
lower on the scale is any remaining interest of foreign sovereigns that is not
formally expressed but otherwise discernible, such as recent trends in the
laws of the foreign states or a statement from a high-ranking foreign
government official in charge of the relevant area. As the importance of the
foreign sovereign interest implicated rises, so too must be the burden that the
party applying for the extraterritorial order to satisfy. When the foreign
sovereign interest is in the first category, a petition for Equity
Extraterritoriality order should almost always be denied; when the foreign
sovereign interest is in the last category, such a petition should almost always
be granted.
The second factor would consider the type and quality of the clash
between the interests of the U.S. sovereign and the foreign sovereign. The
scale for assessing the quality of the clash corresponds to the scale of
weighing foreign sovereign interests discussed above. The most significant
level of clash between the two sovereigns is when a U.S. court is called to
directly challenge the interest of the foreign sovereign itself; accordingly, the
presumption against an Equity Extraterritoriality order in such a situation
should be the most difficult to overcome. The next significant level is when
an extraterritorial order commands an action that is prohibited by the foreign
sovereign by law or regulation, such that the party to be ordered by the court
would end up violating the foreign law or regulation as a result of complying
with the U.S. court order. Next on the scale is when the Equity
Extraterritoriality order does not necessarily violate a foreign law, but puts
the party to be ordered under competing legal obligations, such as a preexisting contractual duty owed to a foreign third party, such that the order
creates double liability. Lowest on the scale would be when the U.S. court
order commands an action that is neither explicitly prohibited by the foreign
sovereign nor causing conflicting legal obligations, but contravenes the
general public policy aims of the foreign sovereign. The same calculus
would apply to this factor: when the clash of sovereign interests is in the
first category, petition for an Equity Extraterritoriality order should almost
always be denied; when the clash is in the last category, such a petition
should almost always be granted.
Below, I further propose several general principles that would govern
the operation of this test.
marketplace in a way indistinguishable from private actors. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012)
(allowing execution against sovereign property used for commercial activity).
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First, the analysis for Equity Extraterritoriality outlined above must be
available at any point during the litigation, at any time when the court
considers issuing an order that may have an extraterritorial effect. This is
because a situation involving Equity Extraterritoriality may arise at any point
during the litigation—for example, in a temporary restraining order, prejudgment attachment, discovery, or post-judgment asset discovery.359
Because comity is an obligation, it must be ready to come into play at any
time there is a potential clash of sovereign interests. This has the same logic
that drove the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sinochem, in which the
court found that forum non conveniens doctrine is available at any time
during the litigation, even before the court established personal and subject
matter jurisdiction.360 Forum non conveniens is another mechanism to
mediate the potential clash of sovereign interests, in that it is invoked when
there is an alternate forum outside of the United States, presumably with its
own interest in adjudicating the dispute.361 It would be sensible that our
proposed mechanism to harmonize the competing interests of sovereigns
operates in the same way by making itself available throughout litigation.
Second, the coverage of extraterritorial orders cannot reach beyond the
person whose personal jurisdiction the court already established. This is to
stop the courts from bootstrapping their way into reaching every corner of
the world by way of an extraterritorial order, by claiming that assisting the
violation of its orders causes an effect within the United States.362 On the
jurisdictional extraterritoriality side, it is a settled rule that the court cannot
assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant whose only contact
with the forum is through the plaintiff.363 A similar rule must hold for Equity
Extraterritoriality: the court cannot assert jurisdiction over a foreign person
whose only contact with the forum is through the court’s extraterritorial
order. To ensure compliance with its Equity Extraterritoriality order, the
court may order the person who is already under the court’s jurisdiction. To

359. Somewhat alarmingly, an Equity Extraterritoriality situation regularly arises in the
“jurisdictional discovery,” under which the U.S. courts order discovery over a foreign party to find
evidence that may establish personal jurisdiction. See generally S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in
the United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH & LEE L. REV. 489, 492 (2010). Such discovery, by
definition, occurs before the court establishes personal jurisdiction, and almost always involves discovery
of evidence located beyond the court’s territorial jurisdiction, as it is conducted over a foreign party.
360. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007).
361. See id. at 430.
362. See discussion supra at Section IV.C.3.
363. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S.
873, 885–90 (2011).
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reach third parties, the court must first establish an independent basis for
jurisdiction over them.
Third, even in situations that warrant the issuance of an extraterritorial
order, the court must modulate the reach of its order by taking into account
the strength of the two links of control that make up Equity
Extraterritoriality: the court’s control over a person, and the person’s control
over properties or conduct subject to the court’s order. If personal
jurisdiction was established by a relatively weak basis, such as “tag”
jurisdiction, the court must be particularly circumspect in issuing a farreaching extraterritorial order. Similarly, if the person to be ordered is a third
party to the litigation whose control over the properties is constructive rather
than actual—such as the intermediary banks that are “holding” the funds
during an electronic fund transfer—the court must consider the
extraterritorial effects of its order even more carefully than usual.
Fourth, in weighing the sovereign interests, the court must actively
solicit the views of the foreign governments and the U.S. political branches,
and give due deference to those views.364 This is to address the current
situation in which “U.S. courts will often unilaterally decide that the foreign
states’ interests are something different from what the foreign states
assert.”365 Direct expression of the sovereign interest is necessary because
submissions by private parties are inadequate to accurately assess the views
of the foreign sovereign. To be sure, foreign sovereigns need not weigh in
on every instance of Equity Extraterritoriality; their silence could also be an
indication of the level of their interest. The involvement of the U.S. political
branches—which would be primarily the U.S. Department of State—is also
important, as mediating the competing sovereign interests is “a political
function of a very high order” 366 that merits an input from the political
branches that reflect the nation’s democratic will.
Fifth, in making the determination, the court must leave a clear
statement of the manner in which it applied the various factors such as the
identified interest of the foreign sovereign, the importance of the said
interest, the level of challenge that its extraterritorial order would pose to the
said interest, views of the foreign sovereign and the United States, and so on.
364. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 218–20 (1942) (treating the Russian government’s
interpretation regarding a Russian decree as “conclusive”); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175,
186–89 (deferring to the declaration by the Chinese government’s interpretation of Chinese law regarding
price controls). See also Childress, supra note 344, at 53–59 (discussing statements submitted by the
governments of South Africa and the United States in In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d
228, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
365. Sant, supra note 23, at 222.
366. Currie, supra note 353, at 182.
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This may seem to be too obvious of a point in a common law system like the
U.S. law, which depends on the courts’ opinions to build the body of the law.
Yet the lack of the courts’ attention on Equity Extraterritoriality has precisely
been the problem, leading to the doctrine’s underdevelopment. Particularly
when they are called to give shape to principles of international law such as
comity, courts have been engaged in “a practice of compounded avoidance—
avoiding,”367 refusing to give a more definite construction of international
law principles as applied to the U.S. law. The problem of Equity
Extraterritoriality, in large part, is a problem of neglect. To redress this
problem, the courts must make a concerted effort to develop a rigorous test
that could respond to the many different situations under which Equity
Extraterritoriality concerns may arise.
c. Application of the Proposed Test
The effect of this proposed test is admittedly far-reaching, because the
proposal completely reverses the treatment of Equity Extraterritoriality in
the U.S. law. But the cases at the top and the bottom of the scale will remain
the same. At the top of the scale, for example, the U.S. court may issue an
extraterritorial order to enforce an embargo, authorized by the political
branches, against a state sponsor of terrorism. Although the interest of the
foreign sovereign may be directly implicated in such a situation, the U.S.
sovereign clearly made known its intention to override the foreign sovereign
interest. As an apparatus of the U.S. sovereign, the U.S. court must be able
to implement its own sovereign interest in such a situation. At the bottom of
the scale, for example, the U.S. court may issue an Equity Extraterritoriality
order to command a defendant to return a specific piece of physical, personal
property that he illegitimately took out of the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Unlike intangible property, physical property is unlikely to invite the foreign
sovereign’s regulatory interest—especially if the physical property was not
present in the foreign sovereign’s territory in the first place. Physical
property is also less likely to be subject to multiple competing claims of
ownership and encumbrance, creating less risk of conflicting legal
obligations.
The intermediate cases, however, would have a different result from the
current regime. Both of the Argentina bond cases—one involving the order
prohibiting payment,368 and the other involving sovereign asset
discovery369—would have a different outcome, because they directly bind
367. Swaine, supra note 22, at 716.
368. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d 246, 254 (2012).
369. See NML Capital, 134 S.Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014).
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the foreign sovereign or the assets owned by the foreign sovereign. In those
cases, the U.S. courts would be prohibited from issuing an extraterritorial
Equity order. Cases that are next on the scale, which may cause a person to
violate foreign law, would likely have a different result as well. An example
of a case on level is Fargo v. Redfield,370 in which the federal district court
in Vermont enjoined a Canadian corporation from adjusting the rail fare on
the tracks that went from Vermont to Canada, although a Canadian law
mandated the fare adjustment. Under my proposed test, this would not be
permissible: the Canadian sovereign expressed its interest by passing a law,
which the Canadian rail company would be forced to violate if the company
followed the U.S. court’s Equity Extraterritoriality order. There is no U.S.
sovereign interest in this case, other than the diffuse and generalized interest
in overseeing the contracts made by a U.S. party. In such a case, the U.S.
court must respect the clearly expressed interest of a foreign sovereign, and
refrain from issuing the requested order.371
A close case would be a situation like Koehler, in which a New York
court ordered a Bermudan bank (that submitted to the court’s jurisdiction) to
deliver stock certificates in order to satisfy the debt owed by the judgment
debtor who kept the certificates at the bank.372 Under the proposed test, it is
likely that the result in Koehler will remain the same. There is no indication
that the stock certificates are subject to competing claims of ownership in
Bermuda, and there is no other discernible interest expressed by the
sovereign of Bermuda. Although the bank is a third party, the court’s claim
of jurisdiction over the Bermudan bank is strong, and so is the bank’s control
over the stock certificates. But small tweaks in the facts may change the
outcome. For example, if the stock certificates were serving as collateral for
a loan, and the judgment debtor’s loss of control in the stock certificates
would trigger a default such that the (foreign) guarantor of the loan would
have to immediately repay the loan, the U.S. court would have to give due
consideration to this extraterritorial effect of its turnover order. (In my view,
this is probably the closest case in which Equity Extraterritoriality order may
be justified.) Similarly, cases involving extraterritorial discovery would be
a close, fact-intensive call. The outcome would depend on several factors,
such as the presence of foreign blocking statutes or other expressions of
foreign sovereign interest, the nature of the evidence to be discovered
370. 22 F. 373, 375 (C.C.D. Vt. 1884).
371. This is similar to the current doctrine of international comity abstention. See, e.g., Royal &
Sun All. Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Vitamin C
Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2016).
372. Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, 12 N.Y.3d 533, 536 (2009).
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(tangible or intangible, for example,) and the quality of control that the party
to be ordered has over the evidence to be discovered, and so on.
B. Potential Objections to the Proposed Test
My proposed test will certainly invite objections, because it represents
a sea change in the U.S. law’s territoriality and comity doctrines. This
approach requires that Equity Extraterritoriality be considered
extraterritorial, although the current U.S. legal thought mostly equates
extraterritoriality with jurisdictional extraterritoriality.373 It also requires
comity and deference to foreign sovereigns as an obligation, not
discretion.374 It may be argued that this approach takes away from the courts
the flexibility traditionally accorded to equitable remedies, potentially
turning the courts into “a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch which
may choose to pick some people’s chestnuts from the fire, and not others,”
as the Supreme Court put it in a case involving Equity Extraterritoriality.375
To these objections, I submit respectfully: as far as Equity Extraterritoriality
is concerned, those results are exactly what this approach seeks to achieve.
As it stands today, Equity Extraterritoriality has no real legal boundaries.
Only the court’s variable sense of modesty stops it from ordering parties to
break foreign laws, putting parties under double liability, or compelling
foreign sovereigns to disclose its military assets. A squishy concept like the
current U.S. doctrine of discretionary comity is not up to the task of putting
a more meaningful check on these extraterritorial excursions. If the U.S. law
is to give any meaning to the doctrine of sovereign territoriality—the
foundational principle of modern international world order—it must also
accept as foundational the principle that manages the conflict among the
interests of various sovereigns. Assessing competing sovereign interests is
a highly political act, more properly left to the political branches that are
empowered with the authority to conduct foreign policy under the
Constitution. The necessary conclusion, then, is any legal test that seeks to
restrain the excess of Equity Extraterritoriality cannot avoid being in some
way rigid, and in some way deferential to the Executive, Congress, and
foreign sovereigns.376

373. See discussion supra at Section II.B.
374. See discussion supra at Section V.A.2.a.
375. First Nat’l Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
376. See Dodge, supra note 355, at 2071 (noting that only in the case of “adjudicative comity” does
the comity operate more as a general standard rather than a specific and rigid rule).
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However, there is a stronger, more fundamental objection. The problem
of Equity Extraterritoriality is ultimately the problem of applying the
territoriality principle. But what if you do not care about territoriality?
Perhaps no solution is necessary for Equity Extraterritoriality, because
extraterritoriality is not a problem.
There are solid arguments in favor of being more permissive on
extraterritoriality. Chief among them is a sense of national competition—”if
we don’t have it our way, they will have it their way.”377 The U.S. judiciary
is certainly not the only one reaching beyond its nation’s territorial
boundaries, as a number of countries including Germany, Japan, Canada and
United Kingdom have also adopted some version of the “effects” test to
regulate matters occurring outside of their territory.378 In doing so, the courts
of these countries—just as much as the U.S. courts—do little to restrain
themselves.379 One may also argue that not all sovereigns are created equal,
such that not all sovereign interests are equal. The United States’
commitment to liberal democracy may mean that the U.S. courts must not
give any deference to foreign sovereign interests that are not an expression
of the democratic will (such as the interest of the North Korean sovereign)
or those that contravene the established liberal principles (such as foreign
laws compelling racial discrimination.)380 Practicality of regulations is yet
another reason to soften the stance on territoriality. It may be argued that if
the United States wants to regulate actions occurring beyond its borders that
significantly affect it, it can only do so through its courts because a sovereign
nation has no true political recourse to control the non-resident individual’s
actions that occur outside of the country.381 Failure to regulate
extraterritorially undermines the domestic regulatory scheme, because
companies doing business in the United States may be able to opt out of the

377. See Burbank, supra note 159, at 1342.
378. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 2, at 125; see also Handl, supra note 194, at 4 (“[T]erritorial
sovereignty could never convincingly be posited as an absolute principle. Instead, it was understood to
require some adjustment in view of states’ physical co-existence and associated transboundary spill-over
effects, and the desirability of international trade and diplomatic intercourse.”).
379. See Swaine, supra note 22, at 687–88; see also Paul, supra note 330, at 7 (“deference to foreign
sovereigns in the name of comity is neither required by customary international law nor reciprocated in
practice.”).
380. See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 9 (1995) (“Sovereignty, a
conception deriving from relations between a prince and his/her subjects, is not a necessary or appropriate
external attribute for the abstraction we call a state.”); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human
Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 876 (1990) (“Those who . . . continue
to trumpet terms like ‘sovereignty’ without relating them to the human rights conditions within the states
under discussion do more than commit an anachronism. They undermine human rights.”).
381. See Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 52–53.
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stricter regulatory regime.382 This problem is particularly acute in the
context of Equity Extraterritoriality, which often involves parties already
under the court’s jurisdiction. Giving additional considerations for actions
occurring beyond the U.S. borders, in essence, creates a two-track system
within the court that favors the party engaging in actions abroad. Indeed,
this was one of the key reasons why the Supreme Court in Aerospatiale
upheld the Equity Extraterritoriality in the context of discovery, even at the
cost of ignoring the Hague Evidence Convention.383
What about the conflicts with other sovereigns that the “spillover” of
regulations may cause? It may be argued that more often than not, the effect
of the spillover is a net positive. Actions occurring across national borders
tend to be under-enforced at any rate. It is preferable to have the regulation
spill over beyond the national territory than to suffer the harms arising from
no regulation at all.384 Further, such spillover, and the resulting (temporary)
diplomatic strife, may ultimately lead to the harmonization of the
international regulatory scheme. The initial extraterritorial excursion could
function like “an initial bid in a kind of contractual bargaining between the
United States and the rest of the world.”385 The courts of the various nations
could behave like arms-length parties negotiating toward an agreement, and
their respective claims of extraterritorial authority would serve as the device
for such negotiation.386
For the practical-minded, these arguments can be quite attractive.
Equity Extraterritoriality is often the best friend of a U.S.-based attorney
representing a client who is harmed by a foreign party’s conducts occurring
abroad. Ultimately, however, I fall on the side of respecting tradition and
enhancing predictability of the law.387 There is a good reason why our courts
have adhered to the territoriality principle since the beginning of the
Republic, despite the periods of waxing and waning doctrinal strength.
Because the concept of territorial sovereignty rests at the heart of the
international order, the logical conclusion of ignoring the territoriality
principles is the undoing the Westphalian order. I do not intend to be overly
382. See Paul, supra note 330, at 73–74.
383. See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 561–67; see also Bermann, supra note 163, at 543–46 (criticizing
the court’s reasoning in Aerospatiale).
384. See Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 490 (arguing in favor of regulatory spillover in the internet
context).
385. Stephan, supra note 207, at 92.
386. For contract-negotiation theory of international judicial cooperation, see Stephan, supra note
207. For a theory of global regulatory harmonization through spillover effects, see Bradford, supra note
208.
387. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897).
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dramatic, as the Peace of Westphalia would surely survive some
modifications around the edges. Nor is it the case that I oppose all
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws—my proposed solution makes clear
that even under more rigorous application of territoriality principles, U.S.
courts may still make extraterritorial orders. What I do find concerning,
however, is that a single district court may cause a far-reaching international
event, such as cutting off a sovereign nation from the international capital
market.388 Modifications to the Westphalian order, and extraterritorial
application of national laws, must come through the political branches
reflecting the democratic will, because assessing the interest of the various
sovereigns is a “political function of a very high order.”389 Yet the current
state of the Equity Extraterritoriality doctrine allows the Court to ignore the
decisions of the political branches, as the Supreme Court did in Aerospatiale
by making the Hague Evidence Convention—a bargained-for multilateral
treaty that the U.S. executive signed—all but a dead letter.390 To the extent
the courts have to reach beyond their territorial jurisdiction, it must do so in
a cautious manner that gives a proper nod to the political branches of the
United States, as to the interests of other sovereigns. The current Equity
Extraterritoriality doctrine, whose contours are poorly defined, is not up to
this task.
VI. CONCLUSION
Equity Extraterritoriality is all instances of the court issuing an
extraterritorial order, which originates from the court’s equity tradition.
Considering its practical significance, the neglect of Equity
Extraterritoriality is surprising. The doctrine has a long history dating back
to pre-American Independence English law. Supreme Court approved
Equity Extraterritoriality in Pennoyer, despite the fact that Equity
Extraterritoriality contradicted the territoriality principles that Pennoyer
applied on judicial jurisdiction. The merger of law and equity and the
personal jurisdiction revolution in the mid-20th century removed the last
remaining checks on the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality, by allowing the
courts to exercise jurisdiction far beyond their territorial jurisdiction in
situations that the courts sitting in equity previously could not reach.
Although the jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction retrenched in the late
20th century and early 21st century, such retrenchment only served to widen
the gap between jurisdictional territoriality, which cautions against
388. See Cross supra at note 124; Pomager supra note 124.
389. Currie, supra note 343, at 182.
390. See Bermann, supra note 163.
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extraterritorial assertion of judicial power, and Equity Extraterritoriality,
which is indifferent to the problems of extraterritoriality.
The heart of the problem with Equity Extraterritoriality is the problem
of extraterritoriality, as Equity Extraterritoriality truly is an exercise of U.S.
court’s authority beyond its territorial jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
current U.S. territoriality jurisprudence to the contrary. The developing
trends of modern capitalism, in particular its ever-increasing reliance on
intangible property, indicate that Equity Extraterritoriality will become even
more important in the coming decades, as the interests of multiple sovereigns
will cross paths more frequently. But the under-developed state of the
doctrine, including its inconsistency with the presumption against
extraterritoriality and transnationality blindness, makes it ill-equipped to
bear this weight.
To deal with Equity Extraterritoriality is to deal with the problem of
extraterritoriality, which in turn is the problem of competing sovereign
interests. There are two contexts in which this problem may arise:
interstate/domestic and international.
To harmonize the competing
sovereign interests involved in a case of domestic Equity Extraterritoriality,
courts may look to the established principles of the U.S. Constitution,
including federalism, separation of powers, the Commerce Clause, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. Addressing the problem
of international Equity Extraterritoriality requires a more novel approach,
because a legal superstructure like the U.S. Constitution does not exist in the
international context. International comity as a mandatory principle, on par
in terms of strength as the principles of territorial sovereignty, may serve as
an animating principle for a conflict of laws-like legal test that would rein in
the excess of Equity Extraterritoriality.

